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IP LEGAL ETHICS IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW:  
AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PATENT LITIGATORS 
WILLIAM T. GALLAGHER 
ABSTRACT 
This article presents preliminary findings from a qualitative empirical study of patent litigators.  
Part of a larger and ongoing project studying intellectual property lawyers in patent, trademark, and 
copyright enforcement and litigation actions, this article focuses on ethical decision-making by 
patent litigators in the pretrial discovery process.  The article is based on data from in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with fifty-five patent litigators and from a detailed case study of the infamous 
Qualcomm patent sanctions case.  The article critically examines how patent litigators perceive of 
and respond to ethical issues that arise in the discovery process.  It also analyzes the structural and 
cultural factors that influence ethical decision-making, as patent litigators navigate the multiple and 
often conflicting demands made throughout the discovery process by clients, firms, colleagues, and 
ethical rules.  A significant finding from this study is that the threat of Qualcomm-like discovery 
sanctions is largely irrelevant to the everyday practice of patent litigators and has had little effect on 
their ethical decision-making.  To-date there are few empirical studies of intellectual property 
lawyers or of legal ethics “in action.”  This study begins to fill that gap. 
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IP LEGAL ETHICS IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW:  
AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PATENT LITIGATORS 
WILLIAM T. GALLAGHER* 
INTRODUCTION:  THE ETHICAL LANDSCAPE OF PATENT LITIGATION 
This article presents findings from an empirical study of U.S. patent litigators—
lawyers who regularly represent clients involved in patent disputes filed in federal 
courts.  Based on original data from interviews with fifty-five patent litigators and a 
case study of a prominent patent lawsuit,1 this study analyzes how patent lawyers 
experience and respond to ethical issues that arise in the everyday practice of law, 
with particular emphasis on ethics in the pretrial discovery process.  It also examines 
how lawyers’ firms, practice groups, clients, norms, and professional ideology 
influence ethical decision-making in patent litigation.  As discussed more fully below, 
there is little empirical research focused on patent lawyers in general and litigators 
specifically.  We thus know very little about this segment of the legal profession, 
which is surprising given the increasing significance of intellectual property 
worldwide over the past two decades and the concomitant transformation of patent 
law practice from a relatively obscure specialization to an elite and prominent 
practice area.  Indeed, while only a generation ago patent law was mostly the 
province of small specialty firms, today virtually all major general practice U.S. law 
firms have significant intellectual property and patent law practices.  This study 
thus provides a unique view into a segment of the legal profession that has not been 
well explored. 
The focus for this study is ethical issues in the patent litigation pretrial 
discovery process.  Discovery is an important part of the litigation process in complex 
cases, and it is certainly an area where most patent litigators spend a significant 
amount of time in their daily practices.  It is an area that patent litigators 
themselves readily identify as raising ethical issues that must be dealt with.  
Discovery is also a potentially revealing part of litigation practice because it is in 
discovery that patent litigators must manage the often competing demands of clients, 
colleagues and their professional obligations towards the courts and the 
                                                                                                                                                
* © William T. Gallagher 2011.  Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of 
Law, Visiting Scholar, Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California Berkeley 
School of Law (Aug. 2009–Jan. 2011).  Earlier versions of this research were presented at the Tenth 
Annual IP Law Scholars Conference, University of California Berkeley School of Law (2010); the 
Fourth International Legal Ethics Conference, Stanford Law School (2010); the University of 
Wisconsin School of Law (2009); Stanford Law School (2009); and the Law and Society Association 
Annual Conference, Denver, Colorado (2009).  I appreciate the feedback I received at each of these 
presentations.  I also specially thank the attorneys who participated in this study.  Without them, 
this research could not have been done.  This research was generously supported by a faculty 
research grant from the Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1 This article discusses district court proceedings in Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 1214 (S.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  All 
citations to court-filed documents are provided by docket number and electronic case files (“ECF”) 
document number, used on the Southern District of California’s Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records (“PACER”) system.  More information about PACER is available at http://www.pacer.gov. 
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administration of justice.  In discussing their discovery practices, patent litigators 
reveal significant insights into their perception of the lawyer’s professional roles and 
visions of what constitutes ethical lawyering.  Discovery is also important because it 
is an arena where litigators risk significant sanctions against their clients and even 
themselves for failure to comply with ethical duties.  This risk is perhaps best 
illustrated by Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,2 a recent, very prominent—even 
infamous—patent litigation lawsuit that raised the specter of lawyer sanctions for 
discovery abuse in highly dramatic circumstances.3  In Qualcomm, a U.S. District 
Court awarded $8.5 million in sanctions for discovery abuse by the plaintiff company 
in a complex patent trial.4  The Court also initially ordered sanctions against several 
of Qualcomm’s outside attorneys for alleged unethical conduct in discovery,5 although 
it ultimately concluded that sanctions were not warranted—albeit after two years of 
pleadings and evidence that rivaled the underlying patent case in size and 
complexity.6 
This article is organized as follows:  Part I identifies the main research issues 
and goals for this article.  It locates the present research in context of both the 
existing empirical literature on intellectual property law and legal ethics as well as 
the larger, ongoing research from which this study derives.  Part II details the 
research methodology employed in this qualitative empirical study.  Part III presents 
the main findings derived from the patent lawyer interview portion of this study.  It 
analyzes what patent litigators understand as their main ethical duties, how they 
identify ethical problems in the course of litigation, and how they respond to them.  
This section also examines the main influences on lawyer ethical decision-making in 
the pretrial discovery process.  Based on the lawyer interview data presented in Part 
III, this article argues that the threat of discovery sanctions—such as those initially 
recommended in the Qualcomm case—are not likely to significantly influence patent 
lawyers’ ethical decision-making or deter unethical conduct.  Part IV examines the 
Qualcomm sanctions case, based on an analysis of the voluminous factual record and 
legal briefing presented in that litigation.  This section uses the Qualcomm case to 
further interpret the findings on patent litigators presented in Part III.  In light of 
both the lawyer interview findings and analysis of Qualcomm, this article concludes 
that Qualcomm may be best understood not as an aberration or “trouble case,” but 
more as a mundane, “everyday” set of practices that are common to complex, high-
                                                                                                                                                
2 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214. 
3 “Infamous” is not hyperbole.  One legal press reporter characterized the Qualcomm sanctions 
case as “the most infamous discovery fiasco in recent times.”  Zusha Elinson, Lawyers in Discovery 
Scandal Say Qualcomm Lied, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov. 3, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202435137932.  The case was the subject of numerous blogs on legal ethics 
and discovery.  It is also prominently included in a new e-discovery law school casebook.  See SHIRA 
SCHEINDLIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE:  CASES AND MATERIALS 425–
42 (2009). 
4 Order Adopting Report and Recommendation on Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and Other 
Expenses, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007), ECF No. 717, 
2007 WL 4351017, at *1. 
5 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, Qualcomm, 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), ECF No. 718, 2008 WL 66932, at *25. 
6 See Order Declining to Impose Sanctions Against the Responding Attorneys and Dissolving 
the Order to Show Cause, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010), 
ECF No. 998, 2010 WL 1336937, at *7. 
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stakes litigation, of which patent litigation is perhaps a prime contemporary 
example. 
I. BACKGROUND:  WHY PATENT LITIGATORS?  WHY ETHICS?  WHY DISCOVERY? 
This study of patent litigators7 is both informed by and contributes to three 
related bodies of scholarly literature:  (1) “law and society” scholarship generally; (2) 
empirical studies of the legal profession and lawyers’ ethics; and (3) empirical studies 
of lawyers’ ethics specifically dealing with civil pretrial discovery issues.  Each of 
these areas of scholarship has guided the research questions and methodological 
approaches employed in this study. 
A. Studying Patent Litigators:  A “Law and Society”  
Perspective on Intellectual Property “In-Action” 
This study applies insights and methods from the rich, interdisciplinary “law 
and society” scholarly tradition to the study of patent litigators.8  Law and society 
scholarship has its intellectual roots in emerging twentieth-century movements such 
as Legal Realism that emphasize the need to study “law-in-action,” or law as it 
                                                                                                                                                
7 By the term “patent litigators,” I simply mean those lawyers who practice patent litigation in 
federal court.  Patent litigators need not obtain any specialized license to represent clients in patent 
lawsuits, unlike those who represent applicants filing for U.S. patents in the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”).  Such licensure requires passage of the patent bar exam.  37 C.F.R. 
§ 11.7(b)(1)(ii) (2010).  Lawyers admitted to any state bar (or that of D.C.) who pass this exam are 
generally referred to as “patent lawyers,” while individuals who pass the exam but do not hold any 
bar membership (and who need not be law school graduates) are generally referred to as “patent 
agents.”  37 C.F.R. § 10.34.  For an excellent historical analysis of the development of the 
professional PTO patent practitioner, see Kara W. Swanson, The Emergence of the Professional 
Patent Practitioner, 50 TECH. & CULTURE 519 (2009).  See also KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT 
OFFICE PONY:  A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT OFFICE (2d ed. 1997).  Currently, there are 
approximately 40,000 registered U.S. patent attorneys and agents.  Patent Attorney/Agent Search, 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI (last modified Dec. 20, 2010).  
California, where this present study was conducted, has the largest number of attorneys and agents 
of all fifty states, id., which is perhaps not surprising given the prominence of its high-tech and 
biotechnology industries.  It is difficult to estimate the current number of patent litigators, even if it 
is clear that this segment of the legal profession has increased dramatically over the past two 
decades. 
8 For a discussion of what constitutes a “law and society” approach to the study of law, see 
KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REAL LAW 
(2010); Lawrence Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986); Bryant 
Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism to Law and Society:  Reshaping Law for the Last Stages 
of the Activist State, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 409, 409 (1998); SIMON HALLIDAY & PATRICK SCHMIDT, 
CONDUCTING LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH:  REFLECTIONS ON METHODS AND PRACTICES (2009); 
CARROLL SERON, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN LAW AND SOCIETY:  THE 
LAW AND SOCIETY CANON (Carroll Seron ed., 2006).  For an argument as to how this perspective 
should be applied to the study of intellectual property, see William T. Gallagher, What is a “Law and 
Society” Perspective on Intellectual Property Law?, in INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN LAW 
AND SOCIETY:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (William T. Gallagher ed., 2007). 
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actually operates in society rather than merely as a self-contained system of rules.9  
The law and society tradition also emphasizes empirical methods to the study of legal 
actors, legal institutions, and legal processes, drawing methodologies and theories 
primarily from the social sciences, including sociology, political science, history, 
anthropology, psychology, and, to a lesser extent, economics.  More recently, the law 
and society tradition has also embraced more humanistic and interpretive 
approaches to the study of legal culture, everyday legal experiences, and the socially 
constitutive nature of law.10 
Yet, despite the increasing prominence of intellectual property law over the past 
several decades, this area of law remains relatively under-examined and under-
theorized from a law and society perspective.11  For example, we simply don’t know a 
lot about the key legal actors in intellectual property law (such as lawyers), or about 
key legal institutions (such as the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”)).12  There is a significant body of law and society scholarship focusing on 
lawyers.  We thus know much about the historical development and social structure 
of the American legal profession,13 and about what lawyers do in very different 
practice settings such as divorce lawyers,14 white-collar criminal defense lawyers,15 
“cause” lawyers,16 tort lawyers,17 public interest lawyers,18 public defenders,19 
                                                                                                                                                
9 Gallagher, supra note 8; see THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 490 (Kermit L. Hall 
et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the “law and society movement” in historical context). 
10 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Coming of Age:  Law and Society Enters an Exclusive Club, 
1 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 1 (2005); AUSTIN SARAT & JONATHAN SIMON, CULTURAL ANALYSIS, 
CULTURAL STUDIES, AND THE LAW:  MOVING BEYOND LEGAL REALISM 1–37 (2003). 
11 See Rosemary J. Coombe, Commodity Culture, Private Censorship, Branded Environments, 
and Global Trade Politics:  Intellectual Property as a Topic of Law and Society Research, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Austin Sarat ed., 2004); see generally Gallagher, 
supra note 8 (surveying law and society scholarship on intellectual property and advocating for more 
such studies). 
12 For a recent “law and society” study of the world’s patent offices, see PETER DRAHOS, THE 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE:  PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS (2010). 
13 See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. 
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:  THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., 
URBAN LAWYERS:  THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005). 
14 See generally LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK:  VARIETIES OF 
PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE (2001); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS 
AND THEIR CLIENTS:  POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995).  
15 See generally KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME:  A PORTRAIT OF 
ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985). 
16 See generally AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE 
LAWYERS (2008); AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE:  
STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (2005); AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, 
SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN:  POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004); AUSTIN 
SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (2001); AUSTIN 
SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERING:  POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES (1998).  
17 See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS:  CONTINGENCY 
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE (2004). 
18 See generally COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE:  PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW-
INCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE (2009). 
19 See generally LISA J. MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER:  THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE 
SHADOWS OF REPUTE (1987). 
[10:309 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 314 
 
conservative movement lawyers,20 lawyers in large firms,21 lawyers in solo and small 
firms,22 lawyers in franchise law firms,23 and lawyers in international arbitration,24 
but very little about intellectual property lawyers, what they do and what effect it 
has on the development of intellectual property law, practice, and policy.  A major 
aim of this study is to begin to fill that gap. 
The genealogy of this study warrants brief mention in order to set the context for 
the research.  This study of patent litigators was derived from a larger and ongoing 
“law and society” research project that began in 2005 focusing on the strategic 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.  One part of this research examines 
intellectual property disputes and focuses on how lawyers enforce trademark and 
copyright claims on behalf of intellectual property owners.25  This project builds on 
the fact that although most intellectual property scholarship examines statutes or 
published legal cases, the vast majority of intellectual property enforcement never 
reaches the stage of filed litigation, and most filed litigation in intellectual property 
cases (as in most other civil litigation) settles well before trial.  Thus, if we want to 
know about how intellectual property rights are enforced—and whether they are 
over-enforced26—we need to examine the everyday practice of the lawyers who help 
clients identify potential targets for enforcement, send “cease and desist” letters, and 
negotiate settlements, all in the “shadow of the law.”  This is where most intellectual 
property law enforcement occurs, which is simply under the radar of most traditional 
intellectual property scholarship.  The second part of this ongoing study examines 
patent litigators.27  One issue that arose in this patent litigator study was ethical 
issues that arise in enforcing patent rights, including in patent litigation.  As this 
issue was probed in many of the research interviews, the Qualcomm case made legal 
press headlines and thus generated rich discussions of the ethical issues faced by 
patent litigators.  Because the patent lawyers studied were so articulate and 
forthcoming in discussing the issues they believed were raised by Qualcomm, this 
topic appeared to warrant a study of its own.  The present research was thus carved 
out of this originally broader study of patent litigators. 
                                                                                                                                                
20 See generally ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT:  PROFESSIONALIZING THE 
CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008). 
21 See generally, e.g., John M. Conley & Scott Baker, Fall from Grace or Business as Usual?  A 
Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 783 (2005) 
(comparing empirical studies of lawyers’ ethics in solo, small, and large firms over time). 
22 See generally, e.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS:  A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
BAR (1966); JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN:  A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS 
IN CHICAGO (1962).. 
23 See generally JERRY VAN HOY, FRANCHISE LAW FIRMS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
PERSONAL LEGAL SERVICES 1 (1997). 
24 See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:  INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996). 
25 See William T. Gallagher, Cease and Desist:  Strategic Intellectual Property Enforcement of 
Trademark and Copyright Claims (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
26 See, e.g., William T. Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Litigation, the Right of 
Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech:  Lessons from the Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Doll 
War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581 (2005) (arguing that weak intellectual property  
rights are routinely over-enforced by repeat-player owners and suggesting further need to study this 
phenomenon empirically). 
27 William T. Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Enforcement of Patent Claims 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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B. Empirical Studies of Lawyers’ Ethics 
The scholarly literature that informs this study specifically deals with studies of 
lawyers’ ethics.  This topic has long been central to the sociology of professions 
literature, with its historical emphasis on either justifying or critiquing lawyers’ 
claimed “professional” status and prerogatives, especially the right to promulgate 
ethical codes and self-regulate lawyer misconduct.28  There is also a strong tradition 
of studying lawyers’ ethics empirically.  Carlin’s classic studies of solo and small-firm 
lawyers’ ethics in-action has been highly influential to subsequent generations of 
scholars of the legal profession.29  A major theme from this work is the contrast 
between the ethical worlds of solo and small-firm lawyers and their counterparts in 
elite, usually large law firms.  In this narrative, elite lawyers’ are generally 
considered at the pinnacle or ethical and professional propriety, while the solo and 
small-firm lawyers’ are characterized as ethically-deficient.  Yet, more recent 
scholarship on lawyers’ ethics has explored how social and economic changes in large-
firm practice over the past several decades has made large-firm practice more 
competitive, uncertain, and unstable.30  A major theme of this research is the effect 
these changes have had on elite lawyers’ visions of professionalism and ethics.  There 
is by now a significant empirical literature that examines large firm and elite 
lawyers’ ethics in a variety of contexts, although none of this literature focuses on 
patent lawyers.31 
C. Lawyers’ Ethics and Civil Pretrial Discovery 
It may seem that examining ethics in the pretrial discovery process is a 
somewhat narrow focus.  In some ways it is, yet discovery is a significant part of 
patent litigators’ practice, certainly compared with the amount of time they spend in 
trial or in court generally.  Moreover, as discussed below, when asked to identify 
areas where “ethical” issues arose in their daily practice, these lawyers identified 
pretrial discovery and conflicts of interests as the two main areas of ethical concern 
in their practices.32  Discovery is an area of practice where litigators must balance 
                                                                                                                                                
28 See, e.g., William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-
Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 492–95 (1995) (surveying sociology of 
professional theories of lawyer ethics and regulation). 
29 See JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS:  A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966); 
JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN:  A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO 
(1962). 
30 See, e.g., Conley & Baker, supra note 21. 
31 See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkens, Promoting Effective Ethical 
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms:  A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 
(2002); Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms:  The Principles of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 631 (2005).  For recent books employing a mix of empirical approaches to the study of 
lawyer’s ethics, see generally RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK:  LEARNING FROM LAWYER 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008); JANINE GRIFFITHS-BAKER, SERVING TWO MASTERS:  CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST IN THE MODERN LAW FIRM (2002); MILTON C. REGAN, EAT WHAT YOU KILL:  THE FALL 
OF THE WALL STREET LAWYER (2004); SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES:  CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE (2002).  
32 See infra Part III.A. 
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their duties to clients, colleagues, courts, and the administration of justice.  
Moreover, because the lawyers in the present study were also all aware of the then-
pending Qualcomm sanctions case, which dealt directly with potential sanctions 
against individual lawyers for alleged discovery and ethical violations, they had 
many opinions about its relevance to their daily practices, which was a potentially 
rich source of data.  Because of this, the narrow focus on ethical issues in discovery 
seemed to warrant in-depth analysis even if it came at the expense of interviewing 
these lawyers on a broader set of ethical topics.33 
Another reason for focusing on ethics issues in pretrial discovery was that it 
allows the present study to build on and compare the study findings with an existing 
and revealing scholarly literature on this topic.34  Wayne Brazil’s early work on civil 
discovery and reform, for instance, was highly influential.35  Brazil’s studies were 
based on data from a large set of structured interviews of Chicago lawyers in the late 
1970s.  Perhaps the key finding from his work was that the character of the discovery 
process in federal court litigation depends significantly on the size and complexity of 
the case.  Most cases, he revealed, are quite “ordinary.”  They raise relatively simple 
legal issues that require little or no discovery by the parties and typically do not 
result in discovery battles.36  In contrast, Brazil found that in a much smaller set of 
cases, typically those involving complex, high-stakes litigation, discovery problems 
were acute.37  Brazil characterized the practices his lawyers described as painting a 
“disturbing picture” of discovery abuse.38  The high-stakes cases created significant 
incentives for lawyers and their clients to try to “game” the system in order to gain 
advantages in the discovery process, including “tactical jockeying, evasive and 
dilatory practices, and various forms of harassment” designed to impose burdens on 
the other party in discovery.39  In half of the complex cases that settled, Brazil’s 
study found that the attorneys for one side believed that they had informational 
advantages over their opposing party due to that party’s inability to obtain 
information in discovery.40  Indeed, the lawyers Brazil studied who worked on these 
complex and high-stakes cases indicated that they wanted judges to issue more 
sanctions for such abusive tactics in discovery, which suggests two important points.  
First, the lawyers believed that abusive discovery tactics were a significant problem 
                                                                                                                                                
33 This is, of course, a trade-off that arises in using in-person interviews as a data source.  
Many lawyer interviewees are busy and at some point in the interview process indicate that they do 
not have unlimited time to talk.  With limited time to ask questions, probe responses, and ask 
follow-up questions, it is often more productive to focus in-depth on fewer topics in order to get more 
detailed descriptions, examples, and explanations.  This was a primary justification for carving out 
the present project as an independent project.  In the ongoing original study of patent litigators, 
other ethical topics are examined, which can complement the finding in the present study. 
34 See generally, e.g., Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow & Bryant G. Garth, Process, People, Power and 
Policy:  Empirical Studies of Civil Procedure and Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010) (providing an insightful historical 
overview of empirical studies of civil discovery and the politics of discovery “reform”). 
35 Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines:  Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the 
System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217 (1980); Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery:  
Lawyers’ Views of its Effectiveness, Its Problems, and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787 (1980). 
36 Brazil, Views from the Front Lines, supra note 35, at 223–24. 
37 Id. at 229–34. 
38 Brazil, Civil Discovery, supra note 35, at 789. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 813. 
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in complex litigation, such that enhanced judicial sanctions were a preferred solution.  
And, second, the fact that these lawyers believed that sanctions were infrequent 
likely means they did not realistically fear them. 
Garth’s late-1990s examination of civil discovery re-confirms Brazil’s many of 
Brazil’s findings about differences between “ordinary” and “high-stakes” litigation.  
As Garth explains, recent studies of the civil discovery process establish “beyond any 
reasonable doubt that we have two very distinct worlds of civil 
discovery . . . involving different kinds of cases, financial stakes, contentiousness, 
complexity and . . . probably even lawyers.”41  Lastly, the late-1990s set of 
preliminary studies in the so-called “Ethics Beyond the Rules” project also focused 
primarily on large-firm lawyers’ ethical decision-making in civil discovery, examining 
many of the structural and cultural influences on lawyer conduct in that setting.42  
This work calls for more empirical research examining whether distinct areas of legal 
practice generate distinct ethical issues and pressures in discovery.  The present 
research aims to begin that task in the context of patent litigation. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
The study presented in this article is based on original data derived from two 
main sources:  semi-structured interviews with patent litigators and a case study of 
the Qualcomm sanctions case documents. 
A. Semi-Structured Interviews 
The interviews for this study were conducted between 2006 and 2010.  A total of 
fifty-five California lawyers who practice patent litigation at least fifty percent of the 
time were interviewed.  Interviewees were selected by means of a non-random 
“snowball” sample technique, which is based on building a sample by means of 
referrals.43  For the present study, several initial respondents were interviewed 
because they were known to be experienced patent litigators.  Each of these lawyers 
in turn was asked to identify other patent litigators who were also asked to 
participate in the interviews (after confirming that they did indeed practice patent 
                                                                                                                                                
41 See Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery:  From Studies of Cost and Delay to the 
Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C.L. REV. 597 (1998). 
42 Douglas N. Frenkel, Robert L. Nelson, & Austin Sarat, Introduction:  Bringing Legal 
Realism to the Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (1998); Robert W. 
Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 709 (1998); Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity:  The Everyday 
Ethics of Defense Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 739 (1998); Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery 
Process as a Circle of Blame:  Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors that 
Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 773 (1998); Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism:  A Study of Judges and Lawyers’ 
Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809 (1998); Marc C. Suchman, 
Working Without a Net:  The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
837 (1998). 
43 See Rowland Atkinson & John Flint, Snowball Sampling, in 3 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 1043–44 (Michael Lewis-Beck et al. eds., 2004). 
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litigation at least fifty percent of the time in their current practice) and were also 
asked to identify other patent litigators who similarly met the study criteria.  This 
sampling technique generated a list of eighty-three identified patent litigators, from 
which individual lawyers were contacted initially by letter inviting them to 
participate in the research interviews.  In follow-up phone calls, these attorneys were 
asked to participate and to agree to have their interviews recorded and transcribed.  
Almost all of the lawyers contacted for this study agreed to participate.44 
Most interviews were conducted in-person at the lawyer’s office and were 
recorded and transcribed.45  Respondents were guaranteed anonymity personally and 
for their firms, so any information that would allow their identities to be determined 
was deleted from the transcripts.46  The interviews lasted between 1–2½ hours each. 
The interviewed lawyers were mostly male (46 out of 55).  Most practiced in 
large law firms with over 75 lawyers, or in local offices of large firms, and 4 of the 
lawyers were in smaller firms of between 5–20 lawyers.  The range of patent 
litigation experience for these lawyers was between 2 and 38 years, with most of the 
lawyers having between 7 to 17 years of patent litigation experience.  Roughly half of 
the litigators in this study were registered to practice before the PTO. 
The interviews were semi-structured and focused broadly on ethical issues in 
patent discovery.47  Opening topics for most interviews generally included:  how the 
lawyer had been first trained to do discovery in patent litigation; what ethical issues 
the lawyer encountered in the discovery process; problems that arise in patent 
litigation discovery; and major influences on each lawyer’s decision-making during 
the discovery process.  Additional topics arose in follow-up questioning based on each 
lawyer’s responses.  All of the lawyers were asked questions about the Qualcomm 
sanctions case (some raised the issues in that case themselves), particularly what 
lessons they took from their understanding of the case, which was pending during all 
of these interviews.  As much as possible, follow-up questions on all topics asked the 
lawyers to provide specific examples of what they were referring to, both to aid in 
clarity and understanding, as well as to make sure that the information elicited in 
the interviews was grounded in particular experiences of the lawyers rather than 
mere generalizations about what “usually” happens. 
                                                                                                                                                
44 Not all of the 84 lawyers on the list were contacted, because the response rate for those who 
were contacted first was so high:  over the course of this study, 67 lawyers were contacted and 
agreed to be interviewed.  Four of these lawyers later backed out due to scheduling problems, 
including pending trials.  Only three lawyers contacted by phone declined to participate.  The 
remaining five lawyers who initially agreed to participate but who were not interviewed for various 
reasons, including scheduling difficulties, agreed to be interviewed for a different part of this 
ongoing study. 
45 Three of the interviews were conducted in my messy law school office due to privacy 
concerns of the lawyers. 
46 To ensure the promised anonymity, all interview tapes and transcripts were reviewed only 
by me and kept in locked files. 
47 For general information on semi-structured interview methodology, see TOM WENGRAF, 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH INTERVIEWING:  BIOGRAPHIC, NARRATIVE, AND SEMI-STRUCTURED (3d prtg. 
2004) and NIGEL KING & CHRISTINE HORROCKS, INTERVIEWS IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (2010). 
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B. Case Study of the Qualcomm v. Broadcom Sanctions Case 
The second data source for this study is the pleadings, filings, and transcripts of 
oral testimony and argument before the Court in the Qualcomm sanctions case, 
which lasted between January 2007 and April 2010.48  This case study method has 
been used effectively, albeit in different ways, in several recent studies of the legal 
profession.  One goal of the present case study is both to analyze and interpret the 
Qualcomm case in light of my interview-based research as well as to generate 
insights for future research. 
III. ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING IN PATENT LITIGATION 
A. Lawyers’ Perceptions of Legal Ethics 
1. Narrow Focus 
At the outset of the interviews for this research, the lawyers were asked to 
identify what ethical issues they faced in patent litigation.  This allowed me to 
generate a list of issues that these lawyers understood to confront them in daily 
practice.  From the interviews, I was also able to get a relative ranking of which 
issues were more challenging as well as which ones were experienced most 
frequently.  All of the lawyers identified both conflicts of interest and pretrial 
discovery issues as the most frequent—and often the most vexing—ethical issues 
they experienced.  Conflicts of interest rules are critical, of course, because they have 
much to do with whether a lawyer or firm can represent a client when such 
representation may be adverse to the lawyer’s or firm’s duty to another client or 
former client.  Because most of the lawyers interviewed worked in large firms, most 
with offices in multiple cities, the lawyers stated that conflicts issues were 
ubiquitous.49  Because the interviewed lawyers were all experienced litigators, it is 
natural that they would identify pretrial discovery as raising challenging ethical 
concerns.  The lawyer interviews for this study focused almost exclusively on pretrial 
discovery issues because at the time the interviews were conducted, the Qualcomm 
discovery sanctions were a “hot topic,” which facilitated in-depth probing of the 
lawyers’ understandings of ethics and professionalism in practice.  The study was 
                                                                                                                                                
48 On theory and methodology in case study research generally, see JOHN GERRING, CASE 
STUDY RESEARCH:  PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2007) and ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH:  
DESIGN AND METHODS, (Vicki Knight et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009). 
49 See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 
GEO. L.J. 1909, 1939 (2006); Chambliss & Wilkens, supra note 31 (examining the rise of a new 
segment of the bar, often called “ethics counsel,” whose main role in larger law firms to deal with 
firm-wide conflicts issues); Kimberly Kirkland, Ethical Infrastructures and De Facto Ethical Norms 
at Work in Large US Law Firms:  The Role of Ethics Counsel, 181 LEGAL ETHICS 154 (2008); 
EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON:  THE SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION 
AMONG PEERS IN A CORPORATE PARTNERSHIP (2001) (stating that lawyers interviewed for his study 
admitted that “conflicts of interest were everywhere, large firms ran into themselves all the time”); 
SHAPIRO, supra note 31 (explaining how conflicts of interest issues are prevalent in many areas of 
legal practice and especially so in intellectual property firms). 
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also designed to incorporate the Qualcomm case study, which also made focusing on 
discovery ethics relevant.  Although the interviews for this study focused primarily 
on discovery topics, it is worth noting that the universe of ethical concerns these 
lawyers identified is fairly narrow.  Very few of the lawyers interviewed identified 
any ethical issues that they experienced in practice other than those relating to 
discovery tactics and conflicts of interest.  In this respect, the present study 
reinforces what other scholars have found studying different groups of lawyers, such 
as large firm lawyers in general.  These scholars suggest that the ethical worldview 
of much contemporary legal practice is based on “pragmatism” and on situational 
judgment rather than any deeper guiding ethical or moral principles.50 
2. Technical Compliance, Zealous Advocacy, and “Monkey Business” as Usual 
The lawyers in the present study also consistently equated professional 
ethicality with technical compliance with the minimum requirements of ethics rules 
that applied in a particular case (and, again, almost all of the issues discussed dealt 
with discovery and conflicts).51  When asked questions about how they saw their 
ethical duties in discovery, these lawyers responded that they had a duty to “play by 
the rules” but not “do anything more.”  As one junior partner stated: 
 I consider myself an ethical lawyer.  I know what I’m supposed to do [in 
discovery] and I do it very well.  I know what the rules say.  That’s my job.  
I’m not going to screw that up.  But I’m also not going to do more than I 
need to.  That isn’t my job as a lawyer.  That doesn’t help my client. 
Almost all of the interviewed lawyers used terms such as “zealous” or 
“aggressive” when describing their role as patent litigators in discovery.  When asked 
to explain their understanding of what being a zealous advocate entailed in discovery 
practice, the lawyers generally explained that it meant taking the strongest positions 
in discovery that were possible given the client’s wishes.  One junior associate 
explained it well52: 
                                                                                                                                                
50 See generally Kirkland, supra note 31 (discussing the notion of pragmatism in lawyers’ legal 
ethics worldview in and summarizing some of these arguments). 
51 See, e.g., DAVID HRICIK, PATENT ETHICS:  LITIGATION 4–5 (2010). 
Four sets of ethical rules and the authorities interpreting them can be relevant to 
determining the ethical, disciplinary, and malpractice issues that arise during 
patent litigation. . . . When a question as to the propriety of lawyer conduct arises 
during federal court litigation, a lawyer must analyze which ethical rules and 
whose interpretation of them apply. 
Id.  The patent litigators for this study are all licensed in California.  But California’s ethics rules 
may not always apply to their actions in a particular case, because the lawyers all had experience 
with patent litigation in other states.  Moreover, in any patent litigation, the analysis of what 
ethical rules may apply can be complicated.  Id. 
52 All quotations from this study are verbatim.  Both the question asked (by this author) and 
the response given by the interviewed lawyer are indicated where warranted in order to provide 
fuller information and context.  Associate attorneys are identified as either “junior” associates, those 
with from 0–4 years of practice, or “senior associates,” those with 5 or more years of practice.  
Partner level attorneys are identified as either “junior” partners, those with 0–5 years of partner-
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 An advocate in discovery is someone who is able to take the strongest 
positions that are consistent with the rules and with the client’s interests.  
In responding to discovery, I read all requests as narrow as possible and I 
object when I can.  In propounding requests—for docs, admissions—I ask 
for everything I can get that I need and I don’t put up with asinine 
objections from the other side.  If I’m in a deposition, defending a depo, I 
make sure my witness is aware of our theory of the case so he’s, so he knows 
how to be careful in testifying and won’t give up information we don’t want 
them to get. 
Q: Do you play hardball in discovery? 
A: Sometimes, of course, that’s what a good lawyer does.  Well, unless the 
client doesn’t want that, but that’s not usual. 
Q: What do you consider playing hardball is in discovery? 
A: You asked it, you should know!  (Laughs.)  Look, get what you need in 
discovery and do what you can do to control information, control what 
the opposing guy, opposing counsel, needs. 
Q: Give me an example. 
A: I object to document requests—real objections.  But then I say subject 
to these objections, we’ll produce.  I interpret requests as narrowly as 
possible.  I see what they want, but I’m not doing his work for him.  
Make him be a good lawyer.  They have to work to figure out what I’m 
objecting to, what I’m producing, whether my objections and 
interpretations are legitimate.  That’s being a good lawyer.  If the other 
side is good, they’ll figure it out.  I do that when I get that kind of 
response.  But sometimes they just give up.  That’s fine for me and my 
client. 
Another senior associate stated that being aggressive in discovery was 
considered the norm in big patent cases.  As he explained: 
 You don’t want to turn over bad documents.  You want to make an 
aggressive argument on privilege, work product.  There are a lot of creative 
theories of how to keep the bad documents back.  Let’s just put it that way.  
And we can keep a lot of them back. 
Q: Is that ethical? 
A: Nothing would violate Rule 11.  But we are pretty aggressive.  It’s 
monkey business as usual in these big cases. 
                                                                                                                                                
level experience, or “senior” partners, those with more than 5 years of partner-level experience.  
Note that none of the interviewed attorneys was “of counsel.” 
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Q: What’s monkey business? 
A: Okay, maybe that’s not the word.  But it is what’s going on.  We are 
aggressive, but not over the line.  It’s badge of honor to know how to 
push the limit but not go over the line. 
Q: Are there incentives to be that way? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Like what? 
A: So, if the document’s bad for your case, the last thing you want to do is 
hand it over to the other side.  So if there’s a way . . . any way of 
holding it back, you do it.  You’re not going to make the partners or 
clients happy if you turn this over without a fight. 
Q: Can you give me an example? 
A: That was surprising coming out of law school.  Because law school is 
like (using an exaggerated high-pitched and whiny voice) “is this 
document privileged”?—and actual litigation is, you push it much 
harder.  You learn that pretty quick.  You, basically if you think you’re 
over Rule 11, even if you think you have a 2% chance of winning in 
court, privilege log it.  Make the other side figure it out. 
Q: Can you explain a bit more what is “privilege logging it”? 
A: Find a way to add the document to the privilege log.  You don’t produce 
it initially.  But you aren’t hiding it.  They see it and need to figure out 
if it belongs on the log.  I make a plausible determination it belongs, 
and they need to figure out if I’m right. 
Q: Do you ever have a problem doing that? 
A: Out of law school, I thought we were supposed to turn over all the 
relevant documents, but you learn that if you want to win, you need to 
be more aggressive, they’re doing it to you, too. 
Q: And that’s fine, is that ethical—you say it is because it meets Rule 11, 
why is that? 
A: You can be aggressive.  That’s what you’re going to do in these big 
patent cases.  There’s a big difference between that and being 
unethical. 
Q: Tell me how, what’s the difference? 
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A: You make an aggressive argument, put documents on a privilege log or 
say they’re work product, that’s how it’s done.  You bury them there.  
You have to have a plausible argument.  The other side sees the 
document title, who sent [it], who received it, the date.  If they’re good, 
they can figure out whether it belongs there or should be produced.  
You just don’t hide documents outright, or ignore them.  Or don’t ask 
the client for them; no one’s going to do that.  Not these big firms.  No 
one’s going to support that. 
A junior partner similarly explained aggressive discovery tactics: 
Q: Do you ever push the edge in discovery? 
A: You are always aggressive to help the client. 
Q: Give me an example. 
A: Bury the opposition with documents or not disclose. 
Q: How do you not disclose? 
A: Object, read the request narrowly, disclose only if you have to.  I’m not 
going to hand something over if it’s going to hurt the client unless I 
have to. 
Q: What do you mean bury them with documents? 
A: Oftentimes, it’s understood you’re going to dump a lot of documents, 
millions, and there’s a chance they won’t find the good stuff, because 
Rule 34 allows you to produce them in the manner they’re kept and you 
don’t have to produce organized in response to specific document 
requests.  There’s a greater chance they’ll miss something as kept in 
ordinary course. 
Q: How did you learn to do that? 
A: I . . . . Large firms understand you’ll be spending lots of time quickly 
looking at documents.  Huge amounts.  That’s the norm.  I don’t think 
anyone ever said “Great, make it really difficult for the other side.” But 
I think it was understood.  I mean, we knew what documents were 
more serious and which were not.  And they would be put in the middle 
and sometimes they’d be found and sometimes not. 
Q: Is that tactic client-driven? 
A: No, not really.  It’s just how you do things, how it’s understood you 
practice in this type of litigation.  You’re meeting the rules but don’t 
give anything away. 
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Thus, the patent litigators in this study expressed a firm conviction that ethical 
lawyering is primarily concerned with zealously advancing the client’s interests, 
rather than a broader notion of a lawyer’s ethical duties to the legal system more 
broadly or even to the concern for a “just” resolution in a case.  The vision of the 
lawyer’s role described by the litigators is that of a loyal and very technically-skilled 
agent of the client.  This, too, is consistent with general findings (and critiques) in the 
empirical literature on lawyers’ ethics. 53  Parker, for example characterizes the ideal 
of zealous advocacy as the 
predominant conception of what lawyers’ role and ethics ought to be in most 
common law countries.  It emphasizes a duty of zealous advocacy to advance 
client ends and relies on the principle that the lawyer is not morally 
responsible for the client’s cause, but must act as his or her agent in 
aggressively advancing it, regardless of the lawyer’s own opinions.54 
3. The Importance of Not Being a Jerk 
One further theme emerged from my questioning of what the interviewed 
lawyers considered “ethical” behavior in discovery.  A large number of them indicated 
that they equated ethical behavior with a high-level of lawyerly proficiency plus a 
minimum level of civility.  Almost all of the lawyers indicated that they considered 
discovery practice in patent cases to be “a big game,” involving too many “clever 
positions” by opposing counsel who seek to prolong discovery battles in an attempt to 
wear down the other side or sometimes even get opponents to give up trying to get 
certain information due to the extraordinary costs of discovery disputes.  Similarly, 
most of the interviewed lawyers stated that they much preferred working with 
opposing counsel who took reasonable positions in discovery and who could be trusted 
not to “play games.”  Civility, the lawyers suggested, made for more effective 
relations between counsel, which ultimately benefited the clients by obviating the 
need for unproductive and expensive discovery battles. 
This parallels a similar finding by Kirkland in her study of large-firm lawyers’ 
ethics.  As Kirkland states it:  “Large-firm litigators are concerned with discerning 
and playing by the customary rules of the adversary game and they look for 
opponents to do the same.”55  Kirkland critiques the equation of civility with 
ethicality.56  She argues that an ethos of civility based merely on intra-professional 
norms of what constitutes good manners in discovery (e.g., by subtly signaling to 
opposing counsel when one is taking an evasive position, which allows good counsel 
to understand the signal and address the incomplete or evasive discovery response 
by, for instance, making a motion to compel) is a weak substitute for a robust notion 
of ethics based on external norms of “justice,” “truth,” and “efficient dispute 
                                                                                                                                                
53 Kirkland, supra note 31, at 716–20 (summarizing some of these scholars’ findings and 
arguments and critiquing lawyer-as-agent role). 
54 CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS 88–89 (1999). 
55 Kirkland, supra note 31, at 723. 
56 Id. at 720. 
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resolution.”57  Yet, Kirkland’s critique may not be entirely on mark, as the lawyers in 
the present study did not consider civility as an end in itself, but as a means of 
achieving truth and efficiency in an adversarial setting.58  These lawyers disdained 
opposing counsel who took uncooperative, evasive, or misleading stances in discovery 
(and who were generally unpleasant about it, too), often characterizing them as 
“jerk” or “asshole” lawyers.  When asked why such lawyers were considered 
unethical, a number of the interviewed lawyers explained that it was precisely 
because it frustrated their efforts to make sure good lawyers on both sides could 
serve their clients well by making sure information that was required to be produced 
actually was, which in turn would tend to produce efficient—and more truthful—
dispute resolution.  When asked to elaborate on this theme, one junior associate 
characterized it as follows: 
 The jerks make it harder for everyone to do their job.  We know lots of 
these cases settle.  They settle best when both sides get what they need.  
You can be a jerk and make it harder, more expensive, make me do motions 
to compel.  Means sometimes the client won’t get all it’s entitled to.  That 
just makes it more unpleasant—I can be a jerk back, too.  And it’s just not 
effective.  I know they think jerking us around gets an advantage, but all it 
does is make me jerk them around, too.  I’m not cooperating on anything—
depo schedules, doc productions, anything, if you’re acting like an idiot for 
no reason, just try to intimidate.  Both clients spend too much, and it makes 
it harder to settle or get ready for trial. 
The lawyers in this thus study pride themselves on being ethical, even if their 
notion of ethicality is narrow and legalistic:  minimum compliance with the ethics 
and discovery rules.  They consider themselves technically proficient in discovery, 
able to take aggressive positions that push the envelope of the ethics rules, but do not 
cross them, and all the while acting civilly—unless they are forced to respond to 
“jerk” lawyers and act in-kind. 
4. Is Patent Discovery Different? 
Is discovery in patent cases different from other cases?  Brazil’s studies on 
discovery ethics in the 1980s suggested that patent cases may have a unique 
“subculture”—although he did not elaborate this finding.59  The interviewed lawyers 
in this study generally agreed that discovery was different in most patent cases due 
to three related factors.  First is the sheer volume of documents that must be 
searched for and analyzed in complex patent cases.  The second factor is that many of 
these documents are highly technical.  And the third factor is an outgrowth of the 
first two:  given the large number of documents to analyze in many cases, larger 
                                                                                                                                                
57 Id. at 724. 
58 Other studies of lawyers’ behavior in discovery were similarly premised on the notion that 
improving lawyer behavior in discovery would enhance the goals of the civil justice system.  See 
Brazil, Views from the Front Lines, supra note 35, at 251. 
59 Id. at 222–45. 
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cases tended to be staffed by large teams or groups of attorneys that need to be 
trained and managed. 
One lawyer stated that in his most recent patent case, his firm had a team of up 
to twelve lawyers review over five million documents for potential production in 
discovery.  A number of lawyers stressed that they needed to search for and review 
many technical documents in patent cases, not infrequently in multiple languages, so 
patent discovery was generally more burdensome to both the attorneys and their 
clients.  Most of the interviewed attorneys also made reference to the relatively new 
electronic discovery rules that apply in federal court (and are not limited to patent 
cases).  These lawyers stated that electronic discovery potentially required even more 
onerous searches for documents in patent litigation than had been the case before the 
rules went into effect.  Electronic discovery also frequently required the use of more 
technically trained assistants to aid document searches, thus adding “another layer 
of people to monitor” as one junior partner stated.  But a number of the interviewed 
lawyers also pointed out that the new rules’ requirements for lawyers to meet and 
agree to document search terms potentially made discovery easier.  As one senior 
associate put it: 
 It’s a lot easier, at least in some of my cases, where the lawyers agree 
at the beginning what searches need to be done, terms, databases.  It covers 
me and puts some burden on the other side’s lawyers. 
The lawyers indicated that the sheer size and complexity of some patent cases 
made it inevitable that relevant documents were not produced.  This is particularly 
the case, several lawyers suggested because discovery is primarily conducted by the 
most junior lawyers, both in order to control costs and also because, as a senior 
associate put it, “the partners won’t do it.”  That same lawyer suggested that the 
process of having inexperienced lawyers so involved in the discovery process, 
particularly document production, was “backwards.”  As he explained: 
 The only thing we know how to do after law school is to write briefs 
and distill cases.  We don’t know how to do any of this discovery stuff.  We 
don’t know what we’re looking for; don’t know all the theories of the case.  
Senior people should be reviewing documents and we should be writing the 
briefs. 
A related theme that arose from discussions on whether patent discovery was 
different from discovery in other types of cases was characterized by one litigator as 
the “fog of war.”  By this phrase, she explained that it is difficult to be certain in large 
patent cases that all relevant information is produced—or even searched for 
adequately—by both sides.  When the interviewed lawyers were asked whether they 
believed any important information had not been produced by their client during 
discovery in their most recent patent case, almost all of the lawyers said yes.  
Similarly, when asked whether they believed their client had received all relevant 
information it had asked for in the same case, the lawyers also generally agreed they 
probably had not.  The explanations for this varied, but included:  lawyer and client 
inattention to some aspect of discovery; problems agreeing on definitions for what 
must be produced; misunderstandings between lawyers and clients about what 
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exactly is required to be searched for and produced; opposing counsel who “dropped 
the ball” when following up on previously made discovery requests; and the lawyers’ 
own changing understandings of what is relevant as a complex, multi-issue case 
develops.  As one junior partner stated, “You don’t always know the technology or the 
legal issues in a patent case in depth until well into the discovery period.  That 
means you’ll miss some things early on.”  A senior partner explained that patent 
discovery was “not perfect . . . you can’t always be certain that everything that’s 
relevant has been uncovered or produced . . . you’ve got to manage that uncertainty 
and minimize errors.” 
These findings and explanations reveal that the discovery process in complex 
and large patent cases is often far from perfect—and not simply due to either client 
or lawyer ethical lapses.  It is in this uncertain context that discovery ethics needs to 
be understood.  Perhaps this is one reason that many of the lawyers for this study 
mentioned the Qualcomm sanctions case and expressed a sentiment (and sometimes 
the exact words) of “There but for the grace of God go I.” 
B. Influences on Lawyer Ethical Decision-Making 
This section seeks to illuminate what influences how patent litigators 
understand ethical issues that arise in discovery and how they deal with them.  The 
major influences identified in this study include the law firms and practice groups 
where these lawyers learn the “rules of thumb” and norms of discovery practice, and 
also negotiate what it means to act professionally and ethically, in their daily work 
with other lawyers. 
1. Arenas of Professionalism:  Structural Influences 
Nelson and Trubek develop the concept of “arenas of professionalism” to explore 
how lawyers socially construct understandings of their roles, including the meanings 
of professionalism, in the context of the everyday practice of law.60  The workplace—
here, law firms—is one such arena.  And the lawyers participating in this study were 
quite insightful in expressing how the demands of daily practice affected how they 
both recognized ethical issues that arise in discovery as well as how to address them. 
When I asked the interviewed lawyers whether they had learned much about 
ethics in general and ethical issues in discovery during law school or in post-
graduation education, such as mandatory continuing legal education training 
(“CLE”), the responses were mostly “no.”  Typically, the lawyers characterized their 
ethical training in law school as “perfunctory,” or “theoretical,” or even “irrelevant” to 
their current legal practice.  They also stated that mandatory CLE classes were “fine” 
but not a significant source for their ethical training or understanding.  The lawyers 
did, however, identify how the realities of the law firm setting influenced how they 
approached discovery.  This general response included several factors.  First, 
                                                                                                                                                
60 See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism:  The Professional 
Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES:  TRANSFORMATIONS IN 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 177, 185 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). 
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sometimes the lawyers characterized their firm as providing in-house training in 
discovery and ethics.  But even the lawyers who stated this did not believe this factor 
was particularly strong.  Second, many of the lawyers, especially the associates and 
junior partners, discussed how the pressures of firm life affected how they practiced 
law.  Most such lawyers stated repeatedly that the need to “stand out” and be viewed 
as partner material was a highly significant influence in their professional lives.  
They explained that they were keenly aware that every aspect of their practice was 
liable to be scrutinized by more senior attorneys, usually powerful partners, whose 
opinions about these lawyers’ skills, work ethic, and ability to please clients was 
paramount to professional success within the firm.  When asked whether having a 
reputation for ethicality was valuable in their firm, the lawyers were divided.  Some 
said that it was a minor but positive factor because their firm had included ethical 
considerations as part of the criteria for promotion and partnership.  Other lawyers 
characterized the need to please powerful partners and these partners’ clients as the 
overriding influence in their professional lives.  Moreover, almost all of the 
interviewed lawyers were adamant that the grinding need in their firm to meet 
substantial billable hours requirements left them little time or ability to spend much 
time or intellectual energy worrying about ethics.  As one senior partner stated: 
 I’m an ethical lawyer.  I work in an ethical firm.  We have a good 
reputation as a firm for the work we do and for our high professional 
reputation.  But, am I wondering every day how to be a good attorney?  No, 
I’m busy working to keep my clients happy, to provide them the highest 
quality legal services they expect, demand.  That’s why they are my client.  
Do I let associates know I expect them to  be good, ethical lawyers?  
Probably not as much as I could.  It’s not a topic of lots of discussion.  We’re 
busy, I let lawyers who work for me know they need to be good and they 
need to work hard and not screw up. 
One junior associate put it as follows: 
 I get that I need to bill a huge number of hours.  Learned that day one.  
My second year here, I was told by a senior associate that whatever you do, 
make sure you bill over 2,000 hours, that nothing else really matters to the 
partners who run this place.  They’ll talk about lifestyle and pro bono or 
things like that but you know, message understood, I get what is going to 
get me noticed as valuable and that’s billing.  I do look to do what the 
partner in charge thinks is right, generally. 
When asked to explain whether this affected how he approached discovery, this 
same associate explained: 
 It affects everything.  We work hard. I think I do a good job in 
discovery.  I set the right tone and get along with clients, who sometimes 
don’t like how bad it gets in patent litigation—these cases can be messy, 
need lots of documents, lots of depositions, lots of disruption to the client.  
So I am sure I manage that.  But the key is not to get the client so mad, you 
lose cooperation. 
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What is clear from this study is that even in firms that discuss ethics and 
professionalism, the over-riding ethos is billing hours, pleasing powerful partners, 
and keeping clients happy.  Although this study focuses on a narrow part of these 
lawyers’ practice, pretrial discovery, it is abundantly clear that all aspects of the 
lawyers’ professional lives are influenced significantly by the economic incentives of 
the never-ending tournament—of the need to hustle continuously both to make 
partner at law firms and to maintain one’s professional worth in a firm once a lawyer 
becomes a partner.  And professional worth stems from billing long hours, from 
appearing competent, from either being a “rainmaker” who brings in clients who can 
afford expensive (and very lucrative) patent litigation, or from having strong 
relationships with such lawyers so that these lawyers can ensure a continued heavy 
workload.  In this respect, the economic needs of the firm influence patent litigators 
in much the same way as scholars have shown they influence lawyers in large law 
firms in general.  Although patent litigators are an elite segment of the bar, they also 
increasingly practice in large law firms, as did most of the lawyers for this study, 
where firm economic needs are of paramount importance to lawyers’ daily practices. 
2. Arenas of Professionalism:  Cultural Influences 
A second strong set of firm influences that the lawyers for this study identified 
related to “culture” or “norms,” words these layers used to explain how and why they 
approached discovery in patent litigation as they did.  Many of the lawyers for this 
study remarked specifically that they learned very little about legal practice 
generally, and about legal ethics specifically, in law school.  Rather, these lawyers 
stressed, most of what they learned was learned “on the job,” in everyday interactions 
with colleagues and clients.61 
Kirkland makes a similar finding.  She shows how large-firm lawyers internalize 
a “distinctive choice of norm rule” that allows them to adopt the ethical norms of 
those attorneys they are working with at the time.62  Big-firm lawyers, Kirkland 
explains, learn that no single firm-wide norm controls all situations.  Norms of 
“what’s done” may vary from partner to partner: 
 As a result, large-firm litigators are accustomed to “looking up and 
around” whenever they make decisions, and they become highly attuned to 
the personalities and preferences of the lawyers for whom they work.  When 
they survey the social landscapes of their firms, they see terrain shaped by 
individual personalities, styles and preferences.  Expectations or norms 
about what hours they work, what kinds of work they do, how they do their 
work, what decisions to make, what public face to wear and etiquette to 
                                                                                                                                                
61 Of course, the same can be said of other professionals.  See, e.g., CHARLES L. BOSK, FORGIVE 
AND REMEMBER:  MANAGING MEDICAL FAILURE 190–91 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing how surgeons learn 
ethical norms of practice in everyday work and interactions with colleagues). 
62 Kirkland, supra note 31, at 710. 
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follow in a given situation vary depending on who a lawyer is working for 
and who has power at the time.63 
One such norm in patent litigation was already discussed above when describing 
how litigators espoused an ethos of aggressiveness in discovery.  The lawyers for this 
study made clear that they mostly learned what to do in discovery (as well as how to 
do it) in actual practice.  A common theme among the litigators was that they were 
provided little direction in how to “do discovery” and had to learn by asking other 
lawyers in the firm for guidance.  And a similarly common response when asking for 
guidance, according to the patent litigators, was that junior lawyers learned to 
conduct discovery according to the norms and practices of the more senior people 
working on any particular case.  Senior lawyers in this study discussed the corollary 
to this:  they emphasized that they typically provided some direction to junior 
lawyers as to how they expected them to conduct themselves in discovery, but 
delegated the day-to-day task of oversight to senior associates and junior partners.  
They expected the lawyers to “get it right” without having to be told how to do it or 
“have their hand held” as one partner put it.  Thus, the patent litigators for this 
study understand that an important guide to discovery ethics is to follow the largely 
unspoken rules of the most important partners in charge of each case.  They 
explained that different lawyers have different styles of doing discovery in patent 
litigation, and a good associate or junior partner needs to quickly understand those 
styles and adopt the ones appropriate to each case.  And these junior lawyers 
generally do not have much disagreement with taking their ethical cues from others.  
The following discussion captures this: 
 It doesn’t pay to try to figure out your own way of doing any of this in 
discovery.  It’s more important to work well with what your team on the 
case is doing.  We all take our cues from, usually from the partner whose 
client this is.  He may not tell you directly, but the junior partners will be 
pretty blunt about telling you what you need to do.  Every partner has his 
own quirks, so you’d be wise to figure out the quirks for your case, given 
whose working it. 
Q: Does that mean you don’t independently evaluate what’s the correct 
thing to do? 
A: Not really.  I don’t have time to.  I mean, I’m not going to do anything 
I’ll get in trouble for.  I’m not about to get the court mad at me 
personally.  But that’s not really an issue.  We all about agree on what 
we need to do. We won’t screw up, that’s not how my firm, most big 
firms do it, it would be too embarrassing.  But you do need to be 
sensitive to the partners’ ideas of how it’s done.  That sets the tone for 
a case. 
Q: Do the partners on the case you’re on now, the software case, do they 
have a particular style for discovery, say in how to review documents 
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for potential production?  Is it different from how partners on another 
recent case do it? 
A: Sure, this happens all the time.  The software case partner is a lot 
more aggressive in all parts of discovery.  I make sure I know what he 
expects and guide my practice knowing that.  My other case . . . I’m on 
now, it’s smaller and I’m mostly in charge of discovery by myself.  So I 
get to set more of the tone of that.  And that partner is fairly hands-off 
because he knows I will get it done and that my style is what he wants.  
He trusts that I can do it right without making him get involved too 
much.  He knows I get how he practices and I’m okay with that. 
Kirkland’s choice of norm rule thus accurately characterizes how these patent 
litigators understand how to act in the discovery process.  The lawyers for this study 
are aware of and articulate about their professed need to adopt the discovery norms 
of the partners in charge of cases.  The partners profess that they want the lawyers 
working for them on a case to follow their lead, yet they also suggest that they do not 
provide much direction in that regard.  The more junior lawyers on the cases tend to 
discuss among themselves what they think the partners in charge want in a 
particular case.  And they are also comfortable with calibrating their ethical “tone” 
on a case to coincide with partners’ preferences and ethical styles.  As they explain, 
nobody is going to do anything outrageous because it would be too embarrassing to 
the firm.  “Pushing the envelope” is fine, if it is called for, but not violating ethical 
rules.64  Thus, these lawyers see an ethical world in discovery that is largely 
negotiable and unproblematic. 
3. Client Influences 
Rosenthall’s 1974 study, Lawyer and Client:  Who’s in Charge?,65 raised an 
important issue about who controls the lawyer-client relationship.  Empirical studies 
of the lawyer-client relationship have suggested there is a danger that lawyers may 
become beholden to corporate clients at the expense of their professional autonomy.66  
One very clear message from the interviewed lawyers was that their patent clients 
exert a great deal of influence over how discovery is done, even if the lawyers also 
agree that they themselves influence discovery as well.  This was true for both large 
clients with experience in patent litigation as well as for smaller clients with little or 
no previous litigation experience.  Most of the interviews began with a discussion of 
the lawyer’s own legal education and practice background.  This was followed by a 
series of questions eliciting information about the types of clients these lawyers had 
in patent litigation matters.  Most of the clients were described as large and 
prominent corporations located in California, the United States, Western Europe, 
                                                                                                                                                
64 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
65 DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT:  WHO’S IN CHARGE? (1974). 
66 See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:  THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE BAR 160–74 (1982) (finding that corporate lawyers have less autonomy from their powerful 
clients than lawyers who serve individual, personal services clients). 
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and Asia (Japan and Korea mostly).  The industries represented by these clients 
included high-tech (computer software and hardware, and electronics), 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies.  When asked to 
identify their last three clients’ level of experience with patent litigation, the lawyers 
indicated overwhelmingly that these clients had been involved in more than two 
patent lawsuits, from either the plaintiff’s or defendant’s side.  Also, about two thirds 
of these clients had in-house legal departments of some sort.  Smaller clients 
generally had up to only a handful of in-house attorneys or paralegals.  But even 
many of the smaller clients (except for two companies identified as start-ups) had 
either a lawyer or paralegal in-house who had IP experience generally or patent 
experience specifically.  The larger clients had commensurately larger in-house legal 
departments with multiple IP–specialist attorneys and paralegals.  Almost none of 
the clients had in-house litigation attorneys, although some in-house counsel were 
described as having a litigation background.  The patent litigation clients that the 
interviewed lawyers had were thus mostly well-established, large corporations, 
although a few smaller and newer companies were represented.  They were also 
generally quite legally sophisticated, as measured by previous experience in patent 
litigation and by the existence of in-house legal departments.  Most of the lawyer 
interviews for this study contained a lengthy discussion concerning how clients 
influenced the lawyers’ approach to discovery in patent litigation. 
Although all of the lawyers in this study indicated that they believed they 
influenced patent clients’ behavior towards complying with discovery obligations, all 
of the lawyers also agreed that their patent clients had an influence on how discovery 
was conducted in any particular case.  This was characterized as a result of either 
the tremendous expense of discovery and also as a function of the culture of 
particular clients.  And the lawyers were quite candid in expressing the fact that it 
was dangerous to even consider doing something in discovery that would unduly 
upset their clients.  Junior lawyers expressed this in terms of their fear that 
upsetting clients would result in having the partner in charge of that client 
negatively assess the lawyer’s competence (and, hence, negatively affect the lawyer’s 
status in the firm or prospects for attaining partner).  But even senior lawyers 
admitted quite openly their need to keep clients happy in often contentious litigation 
because of the economic consequences to them and their firm should the client “fire” 
them and choose different patent litigation counsel.  One senior partner said as 
follows: 
 Of course, you need to keep the client happy.  I’m a “go-to” patent 
litigator, but I’ve lost clients because they get upset during a case.  This is a 
very competitive business.  Even at this level, this is a high level of practice, 
and even here, there is a lot of competition.  The clients know it.  We don’t 
roll over for the clients, but we damn well pay attention to what they want. 
Other lawyers discussed how challenging it can be in patent litigation to make 
sure clients were complying with document requests.  These lawyers stressed that 
they took significant steps to explain to clients what was required and also to do 
extensive follow-up so that the lawyer could be sure that the client had done an 
adequate search and produced required documents.  Yet many of the lawyers also 
explained that it was challenging to be sure in many instances that their instructions 
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and guidelines were followed.  In particular, the lawyers told me that, when working 
with in-house lawyers and paralegals, it was sometimes difficult to know whether 
clients were complying.  This was described as a problem of “translation.”  The 
litigators informed the in-house lawyers and paralegals what they needed to search 
for, but were often not entirely sure how the in-house lawyers characterized these 
obligations to particular employees who needed to do the actual document searches.  
Similarly, companies often have multiple servers, computers, and other locations 
that can be searched, including old, “legacy” systems no longer in use.  When 
discoverable documents might be found in multiple locations, the outside lawyers and 
in-house legal staff typically discuss how best to approach where to search, because 
choices need to be made to make searching practicable.  But, again, although the 
lawyers for this study were adamant that they were actively involved in this process 
in most cases, they admitted that it was sometimes hard to “second-guess” what in-
house legal staff told them, even if they suspected that a search may not have been 
as comprehensive as needed.  One senior associate discussed this as follows: 
 A lot of clients have an internal “scrubbing” process, which is really 
annoying.  They will, the clients will have the in-house lawyers and 
paralegals review the documents first and they make a call on what 
documents to hold back and you won’t know what they’ve held back. 
Q: They don’t tell the outside lawyers? 
A: No. 
Q: On purpose? 
A: Yeah.  They basically say you tell us what you want and we’ll collect it.  
The lawyers, outside lawyers give them their wish-list.  And you 
sometimes have to hope for the best, trust that the client and their in-
house people are doing it right.  But they may be making calls as to 
where they are and are not searching—because they know the 
company better than you—and making calls as to what’s irrelevant, so 
stuff gets decided and may not be shown to the outside lawyers.  You 
can have input, you can ask for assurances and details, but often you 
can’t always be sure it’s complete, that everything has been searched 
for properly. 
Q: So what steps do you take to make sure you’ve done a good, ethical job 
as outside counsel? 
A: Basically push them as much as I can until they get pissed.  But these 
are mostly sophisticated clients; they’ve been sued and sue people over 
patents.  I just make a good record that I’ve done what I needed to do.  
At some point you need to trust the client.  You can’t cross-examine 
them to death. 
Q: Why not?  Why can’t you? 
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A: You need [them] to cooperate.  You need them to help.  The inside 
lawyers have to have their say in this, and it generally works, we 
usually don’t disagree that much.  So cross-examining is not going to go 
over well.  I push, I ask questions, but know when it’s enough. 
Q: Did you ever have a sense in a particular case that a client was not 
turning over what they had to? 
A: (Laughs.)  Yeah. 
Q: What did you do? 
A: I didn’t do anything because it’s up to the partners to do it.  I just told 
the partners I’m not sure the client is turning everything over and the 
partners said they’d handle it.  I’m not sure in that case that we ever 
got all we were supposed to, but I can’t be sure.  I do know the partners 
spoke to the client.  But I feel we often don’t get everything, that inside 
lawyers don’t always get everything because they don’t always know 
and they need to keep their own people happy, too. 
A very interesting and revealing dynamic emerged from discussing this topic:  
the lawyers emphasized their professional autonomy when describing how they 
interacted with their clients.  Yet, at the same time, most of these lawyers admitted 
the significant challenges they experienced in managing client expectations and 
cooperation in the discovery process.  A fairly typical pattern during these interviews 
was for a lawyer to tell me outright that he or she stressed to clients the need to 
comply with discovery obligations.  This was expressed variously, but several lawyers 
told me they needed to give patent clients “the talk” on just what is expected.  It is 
also common for these lawyers to have to repeat this message to individual client 
employees when discussing how to search for and produce documents to the 
attorneys or how to prepare for deposition testimony.  More than a few of the patent 
litigators stated that engineers in particular were difficult to work with because they 
were very busy and often could not believe how onerous searching for documents 
responsive to discovery could be, so initial resistance from such employees was not 
uncommon.  Almost all of the interviewed lawyers stated that it was very hard to be 
certain that all documents were properly searched for in big patent cases and that 
they were sure that mistakes were made due to many factors, including client 
miscommunication, lawyer inadvertence, and the stresses of litigation generally.  But 
these lawyers stressed that they and their firms made efforts to make their clients 
comply with all discovery obligations, including document requests. 
When probed on the topic of clients who resist complying with discovery (usually 
document requests) several of the lawyers made a point of claiming they would not go 
along with a client who asked them to take a position in discovery that the lawyer 
thought violated the ethics rules.  As one senior partner said, “if that happened, I’d 
fire the client.”  One junior partner stated that she would “drop the client if it 
insisted” that she do something in discovery that violated her ethical norms.  And one 
senior associate stated that he would be uncomfortable enough in that scenario that 
he would “try to report the client to the partner in charge” of the case.  Yet, it was 
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striking that each time a lawyer made such a remark, on follow-up questioning, none 
of them could provide an example where they had actually fired a client.  Several 
lawyers, like the one quoted extensively above, did report clients they believed to be 
non-responsive to more senior lawyers on the case.  But they expressed uncertainty 
whether that solved the perceived problem.  At the same time, these junior lawyers 
stated that they saw their job as making a record that they had done what they 
needed to do and that it was the senior partner’s job to take any further action. 
On the one hand, this suggests that the lawyers may have some discomfort with 
the notion that they are simply the agents of the client or perhaps that they value the 
idea they are autonomous professionals who will, in proper circumstances, assert 
professional independence from clients.  But these lawyers expressed that they did 
not often disagree significantly with their patent clients about discovery issues.67  
There was tension, given the costs and demands of patent litigation.  But the lawyers 
made sure that all clients were instructed as to what the discovery rules require.  
And all of the interviewed attorneys insisted that they fully understood their ethical 
duties in discovery.  At the same time, the lawyers expressed doubts that all 
responsive documents are produced in most cases, or sometimes even searched for 
adequately.  When asked to explain their understanding as to why this might be the 
case, the lawyers generally concluded that the size and complexity of large patent 
cases was the source of the problem, although they also conceded that the need to 
keep clients happy was always in their mind when assessing how hard to push the 
clients in discovery. 
A recent empirical study of how corporate lawyers interact with their corporate 
clients on regulatory compliance obligations suggests that the lawyers and corporate 
clients influence each other, so influence is not unidirectional.68  Neither is it 
unidirectional in patent cases, according to the interviewed lawyers.  In the present 
study, the lawyers often agreed that they had influence over whether and how clients 
met their discovery obligations in patent litigation.  Yet they also conceded that the 
need to keep valuable patent clients satisfied is also a significant factor during the 
discovery process.  Nevertheless, this study suggests that lawyers experience 
variation in client responsiveness to lawyers’ instructions during discovery.  Large, 
sophisticated, and repeat–player clients have significant control over the discovery 
process, but they also may agree with lawyerly advice on how best to handle 
discovery obligations—indeed, many lawyers in this study stated that clients 
negotiated with the lawyers but rarely resisted discovery obligations outright.  On 
the other hand, this study suggests that for patent litigators have strong incentives 
to keep clients happy, such that lawyers may at times acquiesce if clients do resist 
what they feel are unduly burdensome discovery requests.  The patent lawyers 
manage this relationship; they also influence it, but clearly do not control it. 
                                                                                                                                                
67 See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER:  SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE 
LAW FIRM (1988) (arguing that economic and organizational influences within large law firms 
threaten professional independence from clients). 
68 See Christine E. Parker, Robert Eli Rosen, & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, The Two Faces of 
Lawyers:  Professional Ethics and Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
201 (2009). 
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4. The Dangers of Disaggregation in Patent Litigation 
One line of questioning in the lawyer interviews focused on ascertaining what—
if anything—in the patent litigation discovery process raised ethical issues that were 
different from in other types of litigation.  The lawyers in this study generally did not 
identify much that they characterized as different in patent cases, although they did 
consistently describe many of their patent cases as discovery “nightmares” (as one 
junior associate put it) due to the high volume of discovery that patent cases can 
generate.  The lawyers also stated consistently that they felt the sheer volume of 
documents that can be involved in patent discovery has been greatly increased due to 
recent federal e-discovery rules.  A second example of what may be unique to the 
patent discovery experience was identified by about a third of the interviewed 
lawyers.  These lawyers stated that discovery in patent cases presents a particular 
challenge in part due to the number of lawyers involved in large patent cases.  One 
junior partner explained it as follows: 
 You’ve got the offensive team, the defensive team. You pull some 
prosecutors out of their offices to help it gets so big . . . the team gets so big 
and you need bodies to do this. 
Q: And that’s different, you think that’s different from other litigation, 
other discovery you’ve done in other cases, not patent cases? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: In your last case, in a patent case, how many lawyers were on the case 
on your side? 
A: I think about twelve total at one point.  It varies, depends where you 
are in it. 
Q: How many of those lawyers . . . were in discovery, working on 
discovery? 
A: Maybe nine or ten at various points.  Mostly six key people through the 
whole case. 
Q: Were these all from your firm? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How are the ethics issues different just because you have lots of 
lawyers on a case? 
A: It just is . . . it makes it harder to coordinate, not drop the ball, keep 
tabs on who’s in charge of what.  That’s the biggest challenge when I 
manage other lawyers on these cases. 
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In some cases, clients also engage multiple law firms, sometimes from different 
cities, which may all be involved in a different aspect of the case, including discovery.  
According to the interviewed lawyers, that also makes it challenging at times to 
coordinate efforts and ensure that discovery is done effectively.  Ethics lawyer John 
Steele has coined the term “disaggregation” to describe this practice of breaking legal 
representation into discrete tasks that can be assigned to various actors, such as 
other firms, in-house lawyers and paralegals, document review attorneys (in the 
United States and overseas), electronic discovery vendors, and technology 
consultants.69 
One intriguing theme possibly related to disaggregation was developed by three 
of the lawyers interviewed for this study. They stated that some firms parcel out 
responsibility for some aspects of discovery, such as document review or expert 
witness preparation, to patent prosecutors, who may not have significant litigation 
experience.  The lawyers explained that prosecutors were used because they often 
had substantive technical knowledge that would help with the patent case.  But these 
lawyers also believed that sometimes prosecutors were assigned to assist with 
discovery primarily because the litigation had heated up and “more bodies” were 
needed to do the work.  When probed as to what issues that practice raised, these 
lawyers explained that it made it difficult to monitor the quality of the work done by 
these lawyers, because they may need more supervision than even junior litigators 
because they may not have significant experience in discovery.  One senior associate 
stated his belief that his firm used prosecutors on big patent cases “to churn the 
client.”  When asked to explain what he meant, the lawyer stated that his firm used 
prosecutors, even if they were not very good doing litigation, because it made more 
money for the firm to do so rather than to “farm out” the work to an outside firm.  
These three interviewed lawyers made it clear they believed the use of patent 
prosecutors who did not have significant experience with litigation made it more 
likely that inadvertent ethical lapses would occur that may not be detected by 
standard oversight in large patent cases.70  To the extent that these three lawyers’ 
understandings of what happens in some large patent litigation cases is accurate, 
and to the extent their observations represent widespread activity, it raises serious 
                                                                                                                                                
69 See John Steele, Disaggregation:  An Emerging Issue, BEAZLEY BRIEF, Jan. 2009, at 1–3, 
available at http://www.legalethicsforum.com/files/beazleybrief_0109-3.pdf.  In developing his 
analysis of the ethical and other risks in disaggregation, Steele uses an example expressly based on 
the Qualcomm case.  Id. 
70 More disturbingly, when discussing this line of questioning with these three lawyers, one 
further issue developed when two of these lawyers opined that their prosecutor colleagues often 
viewed working on discovery issues in patent cases as an easy way to add to their billable hours.  
These two lawyers stated that prosecutors believed it was generally easier to “pad” billable hours 
doing litigation rather than drafting patent claims.  These lawyers were critical of this practice, and 
claimed that their litigation colleagues did not practice this way, but were adamant that it was 
widespread among prosecutors in their firms and, according to one lawyer, also in his previous firm.  
Because so few of the interviewed lawyers identified this issue, it was not fully developed in this 
study.  Obviously, whether or not there is a “norm” of unethical billing practices unique to patent 
litigation may be an important issue for future research.  Once a “taboo,” there is now a body of 
scholarly work suggests that cheating clients by over-billing is a significant problem in many areas 
of legal practice.  See Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale:  An Empirical Study of Associate 
Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of the Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. 
REV. 239, 258–60 (2000); Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking:  Regulation of Billing and Expense 
Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 208, 227–28 (1999). 
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ethical issues that may be unique to patent litigation.  This study suggests that 
because patent case are so huge there are often significant issues of responsibility 
and capacity to oversee and coordinate all work effectively, as ethics rules require. 
C. Are Discovery Sanctions a Deterrent?  
The threat of discovery sanctions, this article suggests, is not a highly significant 
factor in shaping how patent lawyers conduct themselves in pretrial discovery.  In 
part, this stems from the fact that the lawyers in this study have a strong sense of 
their own ethicality in practice and almost never experience serious ethical 
dilemmas.  Thus the threat of sanctions is too remote and abstract to resonate with 
what these lawyers experience in the daily practice of law.  Also, the lawyers in this 
study have a narrow understanding of their ethical duties in the discovery process as 
well as a flexible and pragmatic approach to meeting these duties while at the same 
time managing client and senior partner expectations and pressures to “push the 
envelope” in discovery practice. 
Because the Qualcomm sanctions case was so well known during the course of 
this study, all of the lawyers interviewed were questioned as to whether the case had 
affected their patent litigation practices and, if so, how.  The results of this 
questioning present some of the most intriguing findings from this study.  Given the 
extensive publicity and dramatic facts of the case—in which the Court initially 
sanctioned not only Qualcomm but also a number of its individual attorneys for 
discovery violations—it might be assumed that most of the lawyers interviewed for 
this study would have opinions about the “lessons learned” from Qualcomm.  Each of 
these lawyers was aware of Qualcomm and stated that it has affected his or her 
practice.  Several of the litigators used sports metaphors to characterize the 
Qualcomm case as a “game changer” or “whole new ballgame.”  Most used similarly 
dramatic phrases to characterize the effect of Qualcomm on their patent litigation 
practices, such as “eye opener” or “huge deal.”  Several of the litigators told me that 
the Qualcomm example would allow them to “beat up” their clients who were 
reluctant to comply with their discovery obligations, by using the Qualcomm example 
as a cautionary tale of how a party that does not comply with valid discovery 
requests can be sanctioned.  But when I asked these same lawyers if they had 
actually used the Qualcomm example with any client, the answer was generally no.  
On follow-up questioning, these same lawyers also confirmed that they had rarely, if 
ever, taken a client to task for failing to comply with legitimate discovery requests.  
One senior partner discussed this issue as follows: 
Q:   Have the Qualcomm sanctions against the individual lawyers changed 
the way you practice in patent cases? 
A:   Oh, definitely.  It . . . I mean, I don’t think any lawyer I’ve spoken to 
doesn’t think, there but for the grace of God go I, you know? 
Q:   What do you mean? 
[10:309 2011] Empirical Perspective on Patent Litigators 339 
  
 
A:   It’s just that I think we all realize the fact is that you can be sanctioned 
by the court as an individual lawyer, so you need to be careful in 
discovery.  We don’t forget that.  I don’t.  I’m not going to lose my 
license because of some client who’s messing around. 
Q:   Do you do anything different in discovery in patent cases since the 
Qualcomm decision and publicity? 
A:   Yeah, sure. 
Q:   Like what? 
A:   I make damn sure I tell my clients they need to get me all the 
documents I’m asking for.  I remind them about Qualcomm and what 
can happen if they screw up discovery.  Big time mess. 
Q:   How many times have you done that, told a client about the Qualcomm 
example? 
A:   I don’t think I’ve needed to do that in my recent cases. 
Q:   Can you give me an example from a past case where you have had to 
beat up on a client to make sure they are complying with discovery, 
say, to make sure they are looking for all the documents they need to? 
A:   Not exactly that, but I have clients who find documents that should be 
produced but don’t want me to produce them. 
Q:   What did you do when that happened? 
A:   The case I’m thinking of, I didn’t produce them at first. 
Q:   Did you think they should be produced? 
A:   Yes, absolutely.  And I told the client, but it insisted not to produce 
them.  I just said okay, you’re going to lose a motion to compel, the 
other side is not dumb and they’ll get these, but I will find a way to 
make them make a motion. 
Another junior partner stated it similarly: 
Q:   In the last patent case you did discovery in, do you have that case in 
mind? 
A:  Yes, I’m doing it. 
Q: Okay, in that case, can you tell me in that case what you did differently 
from your usual practice in discovery because of Qualcomm? 
[10:309 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 340 
 
A: Not really a whole lot.  Qualcomm reminds me of how it’s important, 
but it’s more like I already know what to do, this just gives me an 
example to impress the client if I need them to do more. 
Q: In your cases since Qualcomm became such a big deal, how many times 
have you hit the client over the head with the case to try to get them to 
do more in discovery? 
A: I don’t think I’ve had to. 
When I probed the litigators further for examples of what exactly they did 
differently in specific cases because of Qualcomm, the lawyers generally had 
difficulty identifying much, if anything, that they had changed in their daily 
practices.  Many of the lawyers characterized their post-Qualcomm practices as 
prophylactic to their own career:  “making a better record” of their individual efforts, 
rather than necessarily changing or increasing those efforts.  For example, the 
following exchange with one junior partner is typical of many of the responses on this 
issue: 
Q:   How do you practice differently in light of Qualcomm? 
A:   I make sure I’m over-seeing how documents are searched for so I can 
ask the client to do a better search if I need to.  I make a better record 
of what I do to get the client to search for and produce what we need to. 
Q:   How is that different from your previous way of doing it? 
A:   To some extent, it’s not.  I just am careful to make a record that I’m on 
top of things, that I can cover my ass if anyone tries to say I’m not 
doing what I should be in discovery.  I make a record. 
One senior associate colorfully explained that he learned from Qualcomm what 
he “already knew” from life in a large firm: 
 You need to cover your ass more in discovery.  I make a record.  I am 
aware when I sign something.  I make a record what I told clients, what 
follow-up I do.  It’s not a whole lot different from what I always did in 
patent litigation, but I’m more aware that if something goes wrong, I have a 
record of what I did.  You learn that in big firms. These people are not my 
friends when something goes wrong. 
Another junior associate explained the effect of Qualcomm on his practice in 
discovery in the following way: 
 I don’t do much different because of [Qualcomm].  I ask the client to do 
searches and check what they’ve done.  I think it’s actually easier to get this 
done with e-discovery . . . because the lawyers agree, the lawyers on both 
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sides get an agreement usually on what we need to search for, where to 
search, and some terms. 
When asked directly whether the threat of discovery sanctions affected how they 
approach discovery, some of the litigators explained that sanctions were not 
something they were concerned with on a daily basis.  A number of the lawyers told 
me that they were, of course, aware of the potential for sanctions, but that the risk in 
their daily practices was not high, so the issue did not weigh heavily on their minds.  
When asked why the threat of sanctions in discovery were not particularly important 
to them, several lawyers admitted that they had more pressing issues to be 
concerned with, such as pleasing partners or clients, or simply getting work done.  A 
common response from these litigators was that sanctions were so rare they were not 
considered a credible threat.  One senior associate put it as follows: 
 It doesn’t happen.  Judges hate this stuff.  Magistrates hate this stuff; 
don’t like motions to compel or sanctions.  They hate all that crap.  
I . . . even when I think the other side’s guy is being a jerk, I tell my client 
it’s not worth it.  The judge won’t sanction them.  We get the docs on a 
motion to compel, but we’re not getting sanctions.  I don’t think judges like 
to sanction lawyers either, unless it’s for really dirty stuff.  That’s the 
reality.  So when you ask me why I don’t think sanctions are scary, that’s it. 
A related theme emerged from several of the litigators.  When questioned as to 
why discovery sanctions were not high on their list of things that affected their 
discovery practices post-Qualcomm, these lawyers explained that their cases settled 
frequently, leaving issues unresolved, including sanctions for arguable discovery 
violations.71  Thus, the litigators explained both that discovery abuse was often not 
likely to be sanctioned even if brought to the attention of the judges, and also that 
sanctionable behavior often remained hidden because most cases settle.  When asked 
whether they thought judges should issue more sanctions for abusive or unethical 
discovery practices, a number of the litigators agreed, although the reasons for 
agreeing sometimes differed.  This finding is similar to Brazil’s finding from his 
1980s study.72  And it further reinforces the point that sanctions are not considered a 
credible or very immediate threat to patent litigators, even in light of Qualcomm. 
Although individual patent litigators appear not to have changed their discovery 
practices much in light of Qualcomm, this does not mean that Qualcomm either has 
not or will not have any effect on how patent litigators practice, particularly in 
pretrial discovery.  A number of the litigators for this study indicated that their firms 
had taken some steps to systemize “best practices” due to Qualcomm.  Such best 
practices include such things as creating check-lists of things to do in patent 
discovery.73  The most common firm-level change identified by the litigators was an 
                                                                                                                                                
71 And, as in most civil litigation, most patent cases settle pretrial.  See William M. Landes, An 
Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation:  Some Preliminary Results, 41 HOUSTON L. 
REV. 749, 756, 775 (2004). 
72 See Brazil, Views from the Front Lines, supra note 35, at 247–48. 
73 I asked every lawyer who indicated his or her firm had such a check-list if I could see an 
example copy.  No one agreed to show me such a list, usually on the basis that they were reluctant 
to expose firm secrets or policies in writing. 
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in-house presentation made to litigators on discovery practice after Qualcomm.  
Moreover, as Chambliss reminds us, not all changes to law firm ethical practices 
come from individual lawyer initiative.  As she argues, both internal influences, such 
as having ethics counsel more involved in a firm’s ethics issues, and external 
influences, such as having firm practices dictated by malpractice carrier 
requirements, can affect lawyer’s practices.  This suggests that even if patent 
litigators do not themselves alter their practices in light of Qualcomm or the threat of 
discovery sanctions, there may yet be some changes imposed externally.74 
IV. THE QUALCOMM EXAMPLE:  “TROUBLE CASE” OR “EVERYDAY PRACTICE”? 
The Qualcomm sanctions case was an immediate sensation in the legal press 
and online blogs.75  It also became a staple cautionary tale at CLE events nationwide, 
which hoped to glean the lessons of how to avoid the risks of being sanctioned for 
discovery abuse in complex litigation.  All of this is perhaps understandable, because 
both the trial judge (Judge Rudi M. Brewster) and magistrate judge (Judge Barbara 
L. Major) in this case issued orders that left no doubt they considered Qualcomm’s 
discovery misconduct outrageous.  Indeed, Judge Brewster found that Qualcomm’s 
conduct was “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 28576 and ordered the company to pay 
all of Broadcom’s attorney fees and costs for the litigation, totaling more than $8.5 
million.77  Magistrate Judge Major, who was tasked with determining whether 
additional sanctions were warranted for specific individual attorney misconduct, 
initially did sanction six of Qualcomm’s outside lawyers.78  This sanctions order, 
however, was quickly vacated by Judge Brewster on due process grounds because the 
responding attorneys79 had not been able to fully disclose what they had and had not 
done in discovery, because to do so would likely disclose attorney-client privileged 
communications with Qualcomm.80  Judge Brewster subsequently remanded the 
sanctions case back to Judge Major, allowing the responding attorneys the 
opportunity to conduct discovery and to file declarations and legal briefs addressing 
the issue of whether they had violated their ethical duties in the discovery process.81  
The resulting sanctions case became as extensive and expensive as the underlying 
patent trial.  And, after almost two years of post-trial litigation in the sanctions case, 
                                                                                                                                                
74 See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 31, at 715. 
75 See Elinson, supra note 3, at 1. 
76 Order Granting Broadcom’s Motion for Attorney Fees and for Exceptional Case Finding, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007), ECF No. 594, 2007 WL 
2261799, at *1–3. 
77 See Order Adopting Report and Recommendation on Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and Other 
Expenses, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007), ECF No. 717, 
2007 WL 4351017, at *1; see infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
78 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, Qualcomm, 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958, (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), ECF No. 718, 2008 WL 66932, at *9; 
see infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
79 This section refers to the six affected lawyers as the “responding attorneys” for consistency, 
because they are identified that way in much of the sanctions case briefing and orders. 
80 Order Remanding in Part Order of Magistrate Court Re Motion for Sanctions, Qualcomm, 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008), ECF No. 744, 2008 WL 638108, at *2. 
81 Id. at *2–3. 
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Judge Major ultimately determined that, while they had made mistakes, the 
responding attorneys had complied with their ethical obligations in discovery and 
that sanctions were therefore not warranted.82 
This section analyzes the Qualcomm sanctions case in detail.  It explores what 
this case reveals about the realities of ethical decision-making during discovery in 
complex patent cases. It also compares the Qualcomm example with insights from 
the lawyer interviews in Part III, exploring whether the sanctions case is best 
understood as a “trouble case” or as exemplifying “everyday practice.” 
A. The Litigation Background and Discovery Sanctions Case 
The Qualcomm sanctions case arose in a patent infringement lawsuit filed by 
Qualcomm, Inc. against Broadcom Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California in October of 2005.83  This litigation was one of 
several hotly-contested lawsuits between these parties in various forums, including 
federal courts and the International Trade Commission (“ITC”).84  In this case, 
Qualcomm claimed that various products sold by Broadcom, which were compliant 
with an industry-promulgated technical standard called the “H.264 standard,” 
infringed two patents relating to video compression technology.85  The H.264 
standard was developed and adopted by the Joint Video Team (“JVT”), a standards-
setting organization (“SSO”) that was created to develop interoperable technical 
standards for video compression technology.86  The JVT was established as a joint 
project by two standards organizations, the Video Coding Experts Group (“VCEG”) of 
the International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication Standardization 
Sector (“ITU-T”) and the Moving Pictures Expert group (“MPEG”) of the 
International organization for Standardization (“ISO”) and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”).  Standards organizations such as this pool 
resources and coordinate efforts to create universal technology standards to facilitate 
product compatibility within an industry.87 
                                                                                                                                                
82 Order Declining to Impose Sanctions Against the Responding Attorneys and Dissolving the 
Order to Show Cause, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010), 
ECF No. 998, 2010 WL 1336937, at *7. 
83 Qualcomm’s Complaint for Patent Infringement, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-
01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2005), ECF No. 1, 2005 WL 5176496. 
84 See Zusha Elinson, Chip Makers’ $891 Million Settlement Infused by New Blood, 
RECORDER (S.F.), Apr. 28, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/ 
PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202430260838.  After over four years of litigation in these forums, the 
parties ultimately agreed to settle all patent and antitrust cases, with Qualcomm agreeing to pay 
Broadcom $891 million over several years.  Id. 
85 Qualcomm’s Complaint for Patent Infringement, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-
01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2005), ECF No. 1, 2005 WL 5176496. 
86 Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1217–18 (S.D. Cal. 2007) 
(discussing background of JVT), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
87 Id. 
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In its answer,88 Broadcom raised multiple affirmative defenses, including 
waiver.  The waiver defense was based on an allegation that Qualcomm had 
participated in the JVT during the time period the H.264 standard was being 
developed and that Qualcomm had thereby violated a duty to disclose patents 
relevant to the standard—specifically, U.S. Patent No. 5,452,104 (“the ’104 patent”) 
and U.S. Patent No. 5,576,767 (“the ’767 patent”)—thus rendering these patents 
unenforceable.89  The waiver defense thus became a critical issue in pretrial 
discovery.  Although it was but one of many legal issues in this complex patent 
infringement suit, it became one of the most dramatic and heavily litigated issues in 
the entire case. 
1. “Gross Misconduct on a Massive Scale” 
Early on in the pretrial discovery period, Broadcom promulgated multiple broad 
requests for information concerning Qualcomm’s knowledge of, attendance at, and 
participation in the JVT.90  Throughout discovery, Qualcomm consistently 
maintained it had not attended or participated in any JVT proceedings before the 
H.264 standard had been adopted in May of 2003.91  Consistent with this position, 
Qualcomm produced no documents or information in interrogatory responses or 
deposition testimony that indicated any Qualcomm involvement with the JVT before 
May 2003.92  Moreover, through its witnesses and lawyers, Qualcomm continued to 
assert this position forcefully after the discovery period had closed, by means of 
pretrial motions,93 dispositive motions made during trial,94 opening statements at 
                                                                                                                                                
88 Broadcom’s Answer and Counterclaims to Qualcomm’s Complaint for Patent Infringement, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2005), ECF No. 10, 2005 WL 
5176497. 
89 See Qualcomm, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.  For information on the duty to disclose intellectual 
property to standards setting organizations, see Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889 (2002) and Janice Mueller, Patent Misuse 
Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623 (2002). 
90 See Broadcom’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Sanctions at 4 n.4, Qualcomm, 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), ECF No. 540.  This included 
document requests pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 34, interrogatory responses pursuant to FED. R. CIV. 
P. 33, and deposition notices on JVT-related topics pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).  Id.  
Broadcom identifies and quotes the discovery requests in its written motion for sanctions.  Id. 
91 See Qualcomm, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1247–48; Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 
2008), ECF No. 718, 2008 WL 66932, at *3 n.3. 
92 See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), ECF No. 718, 2008 WL 
66932, at *10–12. 
93 See id. at *3 n.3. (“On November 19, 2006 Qualcomm filed (1) a Motion in Limine to exclude 
evidence relating to, among other things, Qualcomm’s participation in the JVT, declaring that the 
‘facts demonstrate’ Qualcomm ‘did not participate in JVT deliberations while the H.264 standard 
was being created’ and (2) a Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law in which it similarly 
asserted its lack of involvement in the H.264 standardization process.”) (citations omitted). 
94 See id. (“In November, Qualcomm filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication (‘MSA’) and 
supporting reply arguing that the evidence established Qualcomm’s non-participation in the JVT 
during the relevant period.  Numerous in-house and outside counsel reviewed the pleadings and 
attorneys Young, Batchelder and Patch argued the motion.”) (citations omitted). 
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trial,95 sidebar discussions during trial,96 and in post-trial proceedings.97  Although 
each of these representations would later be found by the Court to be false, there was 
nothing before the last days of trial to indicate that there was any factual basis for 
Broadcom’s waiver theory. 
That changed dramatically with the trial testimony of Qualcomm witness Viji 
Raveendran, a senior Qualcomm engineer who had previously testified as a 
deposition witness on the JVT issue.  At trial, Ms. Raveendran was offered by 
Qualcomm specifically to rebut any suggestion that Qualcomm had been involved 
with the JVT before May of 2003.98  This would prove to be disastrous.  Raveendran’s 
name appeared on a single critical document in this case, one that had not been 
produced by Qualcomm, but which Broadcom had used unsuccessfully to establish 
Qualcomm’s deep involvement early on in the development of the H.264 standard.99  
The document Broadcom pinned its hopes on for this issue was somewhat obscure:  a 
printout dated November 2002 welcoming a number of apparent email addresses—
including Raveendran—to the “avc_ce mailing list,” which was a distribution list for 
the so-called “Advanced Video Coding (“AVC”) Ad Hoc Group,” of the JVT.  The fact 
that Raveendran’s work email was on this list potentially indicated that she had 
received the message and perhaps others relating to the JVT—which would 
contradict not only Raveendran’s deposition testimony but also all of Qualcomm’s 
previous repeated assurances to the contrary.  Broadcom thus was attempting to use 
the list to raise an inference that Qualcomm had indeed been involved with the JVT 
as early as late 2002.  Its main problem was that no witness in discovery or at trial 
had been able to establish the list had actually been sent to Raveendran. 
Only one week prior to Raveendran’s trial testimony, one of Qualcomm’s outside 
lawyers, Adam Bier, a second-year associate at the Day Casebeer firm who was 
preparing Raveendran for trial, discovered an email dated August 6, 2002 on 
Raveendran’s laptop.100  This had been sent to Raveendran from the avc_ce reflector 
                                                                                                                                                
95 See id. (“Later, in May of ’03, the standard is approved and published.  And then Qualcomm, 
in the fall of 2003, it begins to participate not in JVT because it’s done.  H.264 is approved and 
published.  Qualcomm begins to participate in what are called professional extensions, things that 
sit on top of the standard, additional improvement.”) (quoting the opening statement of Qualcomm’s 
lead attorney James Batchelder). 
96 See id. at *14.  Qualcomm’s attorney Stanley Young argued during a sidebar: 
Actually, there are no emails—there are no emails . . . there’s no evidence that 
any email was actually sent to this list.  This is just a list of email . . . addresses.  
There’s no evidence of anything being sent. . . .   
 
[I]t’s not clear to me [the emails are] responsive to anything.  So that’s something 
that needs to be determined before they would be produced . . . I’m talking about 
whether they were actually requested in discovery . . . I’m simply representing 
that I haven't seen [the emails], and [whether Broadcom requested them] hasn’t 
been determined. 
Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
97 Id. at *6. 
98 See Broadcom’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Sanctions at 4 n.4, Qualcomm, 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2007), ECF No. 540. 
99 See id. at 5–6. 
100 See Declaration of Responding Attorney Adam Bier in Response to Order to Show Cause 
Why Sanctions Should Not be Imposed at 6–8, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958, 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009), ECF No. 945. 
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(the automated server that sent emails to the addresses on the acv_ce mailing list.)101  
No doubt realizing the potential implications of this document, Bier shortly 
thereafter ran a further search on Raveendran’s laptop and found in the archived 
emails twenty-one separate messages sent to Raveendran from the distribution list 
with dates between November 2002 and 2003.102  None of these email messages 
named Raveendran as a recipient, but all were apparently sent to members listed in 
the avc_ce distribution list.  None of these emails had been found during the 
discovery period because Raveendran’s personal laptop computer had not been 
previously searched.103 
Realizing that the emails might be responsive to Broadcom’s JVT-related 
document requests, Bier brought the twenty-one emails to the attention of two other 
Qualcomm outside lawyers, Day Casebeer partner Lee Patch and senior associate 
(and later partner) Christian Mammen.104  Qualcomm’s lead trial counsel, Day 
Casebeer partner James Batchelder, was apprised of the discovery of the Raveendran 
emails, but was then in the process of preparing for trial the next day, so he 
delegated the determination of whether the document should be produced to 
Mammen and Patch.105  These attorneys ultimately decided that the emails were not 
responsive to Broadcom’s discovery requests and they were not produced before 
trial.106  As these lawyers subsequently explained, the determination that the emails 
were not responsive to Broadcom’s document requests was based on numerous 
                                                                                                                                                
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 9–10. 
103 See Declaration of Viji Raveendran in Support of Qualcomm’s Opposition to Broadcom's 
Motion for Sanctions at 1–3, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 
2007), ECF No. 686, 2007 WL 3005525.  This became a key issue in the subsequent sanctions case, 
as Judge Majors expressed incredulity that neither Raveendran nor any of Qualcomm’s 30(b)(6) 
witnesses had their personal files searched for responsive discovery documents.  See Order Granting 
in Part and Denying in Part Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 
No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), ECF No. 718, 2008 WL 66932, at *10–11.  Qualcomm’s outside 
counsel later explained in detail that they had not conducted such searches because they understood 
from Qualcomm’s in-house legal staff and paralegals that such a search would be duplicative of 
efforts already undertaken by Qualcomm.  Id. at *11 n.6. 
104 Declaration of Responding Attorney Adam Bier in Response to Order to Show Cause Why 
Sanctions Should Not be Imposed at 10, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958, (S.D. Cal. 
Nov. 2, 2009), ECF No. 945. 
105 See Supplemental Declaration of Responding Attorney James R. Batchelder in Response to 
Order to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not be Imposed at 14–15, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom 
Corp., No. 05-01958, (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009), ECF No. 941 (attach. no. 2). 
106 See Supplemental Declaration of Responding Attorney Christian E. Mammen in Response 
to Order to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not be Imposed, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp, 
No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009), ECF No. 941 (attach. no. 3).  This decision was the focus of 
much subsequent scrutiny and incredulity by the Court.  Id.  Yet both Mammen and Patch later 
described what led them to characterize the emails as akin to “spam,” and nothing that indicated 
Qualcomm had participated in the JVT.  The somewhat bland content of the twenty-one emails no 
doubt contributed to the lawyers’ decision not to produce them.  Yet the broader significance of the 
emails in light of Qualcomm’s consistent assertions that there was no Qualcomm involvement in the 
JVT before 2003 made the decision not to produce them highly problematic for the Court.  As 
Magistrate Major explained, the existence of the emails, dated November of 2002, in Raveendran’s 
laptop is strong evidence at least of the possibility that Qualcomm was involved in the JVT before 
the H.264 standard was adopted, which mandated their production in discovery.  See Order 
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, Qualcomm, Inc. v. 
Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), ECF No. 718, 2008 WL 66932, at *10–11. 
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factors.  First, none of the emails identified Raveendran or any other Qualcomm 
employee.  Raveendran herself had explained to these same lawyers that she did not 
know how she had been added to this list, was unaware that she had received the 
emails, and had never read them.  Also, the lawyers understood that the chair of the 
group that apparently promulgated the list was a Broadcom employee.  This led them 
to conclude that if Broadcom’s own employee did not have information tying 
Raveendran or any other Qualcomm employee to the group, this was consistent with 
Qualcomm’s position that there had been no such involvement.  Moreover, as the 
lawyers also later explained, the substance of the emails did not lead them to believe 
they were responsive, because they did not deal with technical content relating to the 
H.264 standard.107  Qualcomm’s outside lawyers thus took an extremely narrow and 
aggressive characterization of both the substance of Qualcomm’s discovery requests 
as well as the significance of the twenty-one emails in order to justify not producing 
them before trial.108  The lawyers themselves explained that they simply did not see 
any “red flag” from these emails that led them to believe they were inconsistent with 
Qualcomm’s legal positions at trial.109 
With Raveendran on the stand on the next to last day of trial, Qualcomm’s trial 
counsel responsible for Raveendran’s direct examination, Lee Patch, faced a 
challenge.  He surely wanted to elicit favorable testimony from Raveendran that 
would rebut Broadcom’s waiver theory—specifically rebutting Broadcom’s position 
that the “avc_ce” document (with Raveendran’s email listed) was proof of Qualcomm 
participation in the JVT.  But at the same time counsel did not want to alert 
Broadcom’s trial counsel of the existence of the emails that had been found the week 
before but not produced.  The direct examination thus focused on whether 
Raveendran had ever “sent” emails to this list or “read” any—carefully avoiding 
asking whether she had “received” any such emails: 
Q: Ms. Raveendran, did you place your email address on this list? 
A: No. 
Q: Do you have any understanding as to how it is that your email address 
appears on such a list? 
A: The list is pretty vast.  From what I can see is because Vittorio 
Baroncini is the first author, he knew me as a—someone who is trained 
in compression artifacts and an expert viewer.  So because the primary 
goal of this ad hoc was to evaluate compression technologies, he 
                                                                                                                                                
107 See Declaration of Christian E. Mammen re OSC at 16, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 
No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2007), ECF Nos. 682, 685, 2007 WL 3005523. 
108 Qualcomm’s lawyers took a similarly aggressive position that the emails had been properly 
withheld from discovery on the basis that they were not responsive to any of Broadcom’s document 
requests during post-trial meet-and-confer correspondence with Broadcom relating to the sanctions 
case.  This aggressive position was not appreciated by either Judge. 
109 See Declaration of Christian E. Mammen re OSC at 16, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 
No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2007), ECF Nos. 682, 685, 2007 WL 3005523.; Declaration of Adam 
A. Bier re OSC at 7–8, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2007), 
ECF No. 686, 2007 WL 3005526. 
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probably added my name.  Chairs can do that.  Chairs of ad hoc groups 
can add people to their list. 
Q: Did you ever send mail to this email list? 
A: No. 
Q: Do you have any knowledge of having read mail that came back to you 
from this email list? 
A: No, not that I can recall.110 
Perhaps predictably, on cross-examination, Broadcom’s trial counsel William 
Lee, got Raveendran to reveal that she had indeed received emails from this list and 
had pulled them from her computer just the week before: 
Q: Did you receive mailings from the ad hoc committee identified in this 
exhibit? 
A: During preparation for this testimony, there were some emails pulled 
out of my email box.  Email archive. 
Q: Were they produced to Broadcom? 
A: I don’t know. 
Q: All right.  But during the preparation for your testimony in this case, 
emails to you as a result of your being on this list were pulled out of 
your email box, correct? 
A: Yes.111 
Raveendran’s testimony about the apparently responsive but not-produced 
documents provoked an immediate and strong reaction by Broadcom, which believed 
the emails directly supported its defense that Qualcomm had improperly participated 
in the JVT while the H.264 standard was being developed.  Although Qualcomm’s 
lawyers continued to maintain that the emails were not responsive to discovery 
requests, they produced them to Broadcom during the lunch break that same day.112  
While the jury deliberated, Broadcom made an oral motion for sanctions against 
Qualcomm for having failed to produce what it deemed highly-relevant emails that 
                                                                                                                                                
110 Order re Inequitable Conduct and Waiver, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007), ECF No. 528, 2007 WL 1031373, at *17 (quoting trial testimony from Jan. 
24, 2007). 
111 Id. at *18 (quoting trial testimony from Jan. 24, 2007). 
112 Id.  
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directly supported its waiver defense.  This motion was later renewed in a filed 
motion for sanctions.113 
On January 26, 2007, the jury returned a verdict finding that Qualcomm’s 
patents were valid, but also finding that Broadcom’s products did not infringe those 
patents.114  The jury also returned an advisory verdict on the equitable issues raised 
by Broadcom’s affirmative defenses, finding that Qualcomm’s patents were 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct and waiver.115 
Two months later, on March 21, 2007, Judge Brewster found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Qualcomm participated in the JVT as early as 2002 and, 
pursuant to Federal Circuit authority, had a duty to disclose its ’104 and ’767 patents 
because it knew at that time its patents were “reasonably necessary to practice” the 
H.264 standard.116  The Court held that Qualcomm had, therefore, waived its ability 
to enforce these two patents for failing to disclose them to the JVT.117  Throughout 
this time, Broadcom continued to insist that Qualcomm search for and produce all 
documents relating to its participation with the JVT.  Although Qualcomm vigorously 
opposed this, it ultimately searched for and produced more than 200,000 pages of 
responsive documents.  The existence of so many previously unproduced and highly 
relevant documents apparently outraged the Court.  In an August 6, 2007 order, 
Judge Brewster determined that Qualcomm’s “bad faith participation in the [JVT]” 
and its “litigation misconduct . . . through its employees, hired outside witnesses, and 
trial counsel during discovery, motions practice, trial, and post-trial proceedings” 
justified finding this an “exceptional case” under 35 U.S.C. § 285.118  Accordingly, 
Judge Brewster awarded Broadcom all of its attorney fees and costs for the lawsuit, 
totaling over $8.5 million dollars.119 
In a scathing companion order filed the same day, Judge Brewster also 
excoriated Qualcomm and its attorneys for what he found to be egregious behavior 
throughout the lawsuit, citing this as a further basis for granting Broadcom’s waiver 
motion.  As Judge Brewster explained: 
Qualcomm’s post-trial production of documents directly and unequivocally 
exposes as blatantly false Qualcomm’s steadfast assertions at summary 
judgment, during trial, and at the post-trial hearing on waiver and 
inequitable conduct that it did not participate in the JVT until after May 
2003.  The Court FINDS well beyond clear and convincing evidence that 
                                                                                                                                                
113 Broadcom’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Sanctions at 4 n.4, Qualcomm, Inc. v. 
Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), ECF No. 540. 
114 Verdict Form, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007), 
ECF No. 499, 2007 WL 444925. 
115 Id. 
116 Order re Inequitable Conduct and Waiver, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007), ECF No. 528, 2007 WL 1031373, at *16.  The Court cited Rambus, Inc. v. 
Infineon Technologies, AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), as setting the standard of law for when a 
participant in a standards-setting organization has a duty to disclose patent rights that “reasonably 
might be necessary to practice” the relevant standard.  Id. at *7. 
117 Id. at *8–14. 
118 Order Granting Broadcom’s Motion for Attorney Fees and for Exceptional Case Finding, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007), ECF No. 594, 2007 WL 
2261799, at *1–3. 
119 Id. 
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Qualcomm participated in the JVT from as early as January 2002 . . . well 
before the JVT released the H.264 standard in May 2003.120 
Judge Brewster further listed in damning detail what he determined was 
intentional and egregious misconduct by Qualcomm, its employees, and witnesses—
conduct the Court characterized as “aggravated litigation abuse”:121 
[F]aced with the additional evidence produced post-trial by Qualcomm, the 
Court concludes that the conduct of Qualcomm’s employees before trial, and 
its employees and hired witnesses during pre-trial, trial, and post-trial 
outlines misconduct even more extensive than the Court previously found in 
its March 21 Order . . . [m]erely the reiteration of the chronology of events 
above and below tells the story of the gravity of the conduct.  The facts 
speak for themselves.  The totality of the circumstances leads the Court to 
conclude by clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm intentionally 
organized a plan of action to shield the ’104 and ’767 patents from 
consideration by the JVT with the anticipation that (1) the resulting H.264 
standard would infringe those patents and (2) Qualcomm would then have 
an opportunity to be an indispensable licensor to anyone in the world 
seeking to produce an H.264-compliant product.122 
Judge Brewster also targeted Qualcomm’s attorneys specifically by finding “by 
clear and convincing evidence that Qualcomm[’s] counsel participated in an 
organized program of litigation misconduct and concealment throughout discovery, 
trial, and post-trial.”123  Judge Brewster continued: 
As is clear to the Court now, Qualcomm failed to produce even one of the 
over two hundred thousand pages of emails, memoranda, and electronic 
documents related to Qualcomm’s participation in the JVT, which were 
finally produced after trial.124 
The Court specifically listed multiple instances where Qualcomm’s attorneys 
had insisted that there was no evidence of any Qualcomm participation in the JVT 
before the H.264 standard was released, including during pretrial discovery,125 in 
pretrial motions,126 in trial counsel’s opening statements,127 in sidebar statements 
                                                                                                                                                
120 Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part, 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Jessie Seyfer, Day Casebeer, Heller 
Taken to the Woodshed Over Discovery Conduct, RECORDER (S.F.), Aug. 8, 2007, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=900005556675. 
121 Qualcomm, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1227. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1234. 
124 Id. at 1238. 
125 Id. at 1234–39. 
126 Id. at 1240–44 (discussing Qualcomm’s motions for summary adjudication in its favor on the 
waiver defense, Qualcomm’s motions in limine to exclude any evidence of Qualcomm participation in 
the JVT), and Qualcomm’s trial memorandum). 
127 Id. at 1244 
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made at trial,128 and during post-trial efforts to resist Broadcom’s further discovery 
requests made in support of its motion for sanctions.  The Court stressed that it was 
only after several months of resisting Broadcom’s129 post-trial discovery requests that 
Qualcomm had conducted additional searches of four Qualcomm employees’ 
computers, which led to the discovery of the thousands of previously unproduced 
documents that even Qualcomm’s trial counsel, and in-house general counsel were 
forced to concede clearly supported Broadcom’s waiver defense.130  Both lawyers 
submitted letters to Judge Brewster on April 9, 2007, apologizing for not having 
located and produced these documents previously as well as for having asserted 
positions throughout the litigation that were contradicted by the newly-discovered 
evidence.131  One week after submitting his letter to the Court, Lupin resigned from 
Qualcomm.132  But these letters did not appease Judge Brewster, who concluded that: 
In light of all of the above evidence finally revealed, the eventual collapse of 
Qualcomm’s concealment efforts exposes the carefully orchestrated plan 
and the deadly determination of Qualcomm to achieve its goal of holding 
hostage the entire industry desiring to practice the H.264 standard by 
insulating its IPR from the JVT so that the JVT would lose the opportunity 
to mitigate, if not to avoid, Qualcomm’s IPR in the development of the 
H.264 standard.  Broadcom, ignorant of the existence of the ’104 and ’767 
patents, designed and is in the process of manufacturing numerous H.264-
compliant products.133 
Focusing on the lawyers, Judge Brewster characterized Qualcomm’s outside 
counsel’s conduct during discovery as “indefensible”: 
Qualcomm counsel’s discovery responses demonstrate that they were able to 
locate with alacrity company records from December 2003 forward and find 
four or more Qualcomm employees participating in proceedings of the JVT.  
Yet inexplicably, they were unable to find over 200,000 pages of relevant 
emails, memoranda, and other company documents, hundreds of pages of 
which explicitly document massive participation in JVT proceedings since 
at least January 2002.  These examples of Qualcomm counsel’s indefensible 
discovery conduct belie counsel’s later implied protestation of having been 
“kept in the dark” by their client.134 
Judge Brewster was clearly outraged by what he understood to be deliberate and 
egregious misconduct by Qualcomm and its lawyers.  Judge Brewster delegated to 
                                                                                                                                                
128 Id. at 1244–45. 
129 Id. at 1248. 
130 Id. at 1245–48. 
131 Id. (quoting from letters to the Court sent by trial counsel James Batchelder and Qualcomm 
General Counsel Louis Lupin). 
132 See Jessie Seyfer, Three Strikes, and Qualcomm’s General Counsel Is Out, RECORDER (S.F.), 
Aug. 14, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=900005556769. 
133 Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1248 (S.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part, 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
134 Id. at 1239. 
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Magistrate Judge Major the task of determining whether further sanctions, including 
sanctions against individual lawyers, were warranted.  Judge Major issued an order 
to show cause (“OSC”) one week later, indicating that the Court was “inclined to 
consider the imposition of any and all appropriate sanctions on Qualcomm’s 
attorneys,” identifying fourteen of those lawyers by name.135  The OSC was worded 
broadly to potentially implicate a number of Qualcomm’s outside attorneys in the 
case.  But it did not require Qualcomm’s in-house attorneys to respond and explain 
themselves.  This move raised the stakes considerably, as Qualcomm’s outside 
lawyers were now forced to fight for their professional reputations in an increasingly 
public manner. 
2. Discovery Sanctions and Due Process 
Perhaps the most vexing issue facing the attorneys responding to the OSC was 
how to explain to the Court what they had done (or had not done)—and why—during 
pretrial discovery.  To avoid individual sanctions under the OSC, the attorneys 
needed to persuade Judge Major that they had fully met their discovery obligations.  
Yet they were hindered in that task because any declarations or other evidence they 
might submit to the Court in their defense would almost certainly reveal 
communications with Qualcomm employees (e.g., the in-house legal and paralegal 
staff, or even witnesses) that were protected by the attorney-client privilege.  
Because Qualcomm refused to waive the privilege, six of the responding attorneys 
from the Heller Ehrman firm filed a motion136 seeking leave to disclose privileged or 
confidential information under the federal common law self-defense exemption, 
which permits a lawyer to disclose confidential client communications in limited 
circumstances.137  Twelve additional attorneys from the Day Casebeer firm joined in 
this motion.138  The brief filed in support of this motion squarely raised the issue that 
Qualcomm’s outside attorneys could not fully and fairly defend themselves from the 
Court’s threatened sanctions without a finding that the federal common law self-
defense exception was applicable.139  Complicating this task was the fact that, while 
federal courts have recognized this exception under certain circumstances, courts 
                                                                                                                                                
135 Order to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not Be Imposed at 2, Qualcomm, Inc. v. 
Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007), ECF No. 599. 
136 Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities by Noonan Lance & Hodge LLP, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007), ECF No. 634 (attach. 1), 
2007 WL 2821221. 
137 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 307–11 (1986) (discussing lawyer self-
defense and self-interest exceptions to attorney-client privilege, but also concluding that “the 
exception does not stand on very firm theoretical ground”). 
138 Notice of Joinder by Shartsis Friese LLP in Heller Attorney’s Motion re Self Defense  
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. 
Cal. Sept. 18, 2007), ECF No. 635; Notice of Joinder by Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP, Qualcomm, Inc. v. 
Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2007), ECF No. 643. 
139 Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities by Noonan Lance & Hodge LLP, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007), ECF No. 634 (attach. 1), 
2007 WL 2821221. 
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applying state law and California’s arguably stricter ethical restrictions140 have 
rejected a similar exemption.141  The attorneys thus asked the Court to find the 
exception applicable to the OSC and thus to rule that California’s ethical rules did 
not apply.142  As the responding attorneys succinctly stated, it would not be 
“consistent with due process of law to require an attorney to respond to serious 
charges of professional impropriety without access to the evidence necessary to 
mount a complete defense.”143  Judge Major denied the motion, however, holding that 
the federal self-defense exception was not properly invoked under the facts of this 
case.144  She reasoned that the OSC did not involve a suit or threat of suit against the 
lawyers by a third party nor did it involve any complaint or allegation against the 
lawyers by Qualcomm, thus rendering this defense inapplicable.145  The Court did, 
however, allow the responding lawyers to submit any attorney work product, 
reasoning that work product belonged to the attorneys and the right to withhold it 
from disclosure could be waived by them.146 
At the day-long hearing on the OSC held on October 12, 2007, Magistrate Judge 
Major opened the proceedings by announcing that “[t]he reason we are here today is 
to determine whether there are specific attorneys who also should be sanctioned.”147  
Judge Major made it clear that she had carefully read the briefs, declarations, and 
other materials submitted by the responding attorneys,148 Qualcomm,149 and 
Broadcom.150 
                                                                                                                                                
140 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(1) (West 2010) (“It is the duty of an attorney . . . to 
maintain inviolable the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secret, of 
his or her client.”).  This duty is also incorporated into the California Rules of Professional Conduct 
at Rule 3-100(A).  Comment 1 to Rule 3-100(A) explains that: “A member shall not reveal 
information protected from disclosure by [B&P Code section 6068 (e) (1)] without the informed 
consent of the client.”). 
141 See, e.g., McDermott, Will & Emory v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 83 Cal. App. 4th 378, 
385 (2000); see also Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court of San Diego Cnty., 92 Cal. 
App. 3d 934, 944–45 (1979).  
142 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities by Noonan Lance & Hodge LLP, Qualcomm, 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007), ECF No. 634, 2007 WL 2821221, at 
*12. 
143 Id. 
144 Order Denying Motion for an Order Determining That the Federal Common Law Self-
Defense Exception to Disclosing Privileged and/or Confidential Information Applies, Qualcomm, Inc. 
v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007), ECF No. 669, 2007 WL 2900537, at *1. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Transcript of Order to Show Cause Hearing Before Judge Barbara Lynn Major on Oct. 12, 
2007 at 3, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007), ECF No. 712. 
148 See generally Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2007, ECF 
Nos. 673–74, 676–80, 683, 685–87, 689–91, 693–700) (declarations of responding attorneys 
regarding the OSC). 
149 See generally Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2007, ECF 
Nos. 681, 683–84, 688 (declarations of four Qualcomm employees in opposition to Broadcom’s motion 
for sanctions); Qualcomm’s Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2007), ECF No. 706. 
150 See Broadcom’s Response to Pleadings and Declarations of Qualcomm and its Attorneys in 
Response to Order to Show Cause, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 
9, 2007), ECF No. 705. 
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Her initial remarks did not bode well for the responding attorneys, as Judge 
Major remarked that her review of the material submitted to the Court confirmed 
Judge Brewster’s earlier conclusion that there had been “gross misconduct on a 
massive scale.”151  Judge Major concluded that the responding attorney declarations 
that had been submitted to her: 
At best . . . reveal a massive responsibility reflection.  Everybody said that 
they handled their job correctly and that they weren’t responsible for what 
happened . . . [a]t worst, the declarations establish an organized effort to 
prevent the disclosure of evidence that would undermine Qualcomm’s legal 
case and its ability to force competitors, including Broadcom, to license its 
technology in order to utilize the agreed-upon H.264 standard.152 
Yet Judge Major also immediately stated that the “first issue” for the hearing 
was the significant due process concern raised by the responding attorneys’ inability 
to present highly relevant information about their conduct in discovery because of the 
attorney-client privilege: 
Qualcomm has not waived their privilege.  They have every right not to do 
so . . . and I do not attach any negative inference to Qualcomm for that 
decision, but the result of that decision is that it does limit the facts that are 
available to this Court in reaching its decision . . . [t]he attorneys indicated 
in their declarations there was information they would have liked to provide 
to the Court but were unable to do so.  On the other hand, the declarations 
submitted by the Qualcomm employees either implied or stated that there 
were questions not asked, requests not made by the lawyers, the outside 
lawyers who were representing them.  And so I am concerned about the 
fairness to the attorneys who can’t respond to those allegations.153 
The due process and fairness issues were raised frequently at the hearings, and 
not just by the responding attorneys’ counsel.154  While Qualcomm took the position 
that it had been sufficiently sanctioned by Judge Brewster’s exceptional case finding 
and award of attorney’s fees—as well as by the attendant negative publicity the 
company suffered as a result—Qualcomm’s counsel, William S. Boggs, also conceded 
there might be a major due process problem for the responding attorneys because of 
his client’s unwillingness to waive the privilege.155  Broadcom’s counsel, William F. 
                                                                                                                                                
151 Transcript of Order to Show Cause Hearing Before Judge Barbara Lynn Major on Oct. 12, 
2007 at 3, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007), ECF No. 712. 
152 Id. at 3–4. 
153 Id. at 4–5. 
154 For example, counsel for eleven of the responding attorneys, Joel Zeldin, identified 
statements in each of Qualcomm’s four filed declarations that, he asserted, his clients would be able 
to rebut, but were precluded from doing so under the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., id. at 23 
(“The bottom line is I could go through these declarations paragraph by paragraph and show you 
how the privileged information is directly on point, refutes what they’re saying.  It’s favorable to the 
attorneys, but we can’t use it.  That’s a due process problem.”). 
155 Id. at 34–39 (“[W]e have repeatedly said we believe [responding attorneys] should not be 
sanctioned.”).  Boggs also agreed with respondent’s counsel that the privilege issue in the case raised 
a due process problem for the responding attorneys.  Id. 
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Lee, did not advocate for sanctions against the individual responding attorneys, even 
as he forcefully argued for the Court to sanction Qualcomm.156 
At various points during the hearing, Judge Major made clear that she was 
greatly disturbed by the ease at which Qualcomm had ultimately produced highly 
relevant JVT-related documents post-trial, for example: 
[T]he initial concern is how in the world Qualcomm, a huge corporation 
with lots of very good in-house lawyers and some very good outside counsel, 
how in the world 200,000 emails and documents were not produced.  To me, 
that is a fundamental and monumental error.  And to me that is what led to 
all of the rest of the misconduct in this case.157 
And the Court repeated several times the need for sanctions to deter such 
misconduct: 
If there isn’t some sort of sanction for that conduct, where is the deterrence?  
Nobody produces.  Oh, if I don’t search server two, I’ll never find the 
documents.  So I’m not going to search server two.  I’m just going to search 
server one.  We have no documents.  We’re done.  How can that possibly be 
tolerated in this age of digital evidence?158 
And later: 
[Qualcomm] knowingly withheld an incredible number of documents that 
ended up being crucial to the arguments presented by Broadcom.  There has 
to be a deterrent to that type of conduct.159 
After the extraordinary hearing, Judge Major took the sanctions case under 
submission.  Three months later, Judge Major issued a 48-page order sanctioning 
Qualcomm and six of the responding attorneys.160  Judge Major stated that the 
evidence before her led to the “inevitable conclusion” that: 
Qualcomm intentionally withheld tens of thousands of decisive documents 
from its opponent in an effort to win this case and gain a strategic business 
advantage over Broadcom.  Qualcomm could not have achieved this goal 
without some type of assistance or deliberate ignorance from its retained 
                                                                                                                                                
156 See, e.g., id. at 190–94.  Broadcom wanted the Court to sanction Qualcomm—not to get any 
additional monetary award, but to have an alternative legal basis for the award that Judge 
Brewster had already granted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285 (exceptional case doctrine), but which 
Qualcomm had appealed.  Id.  This alternative would thus provide another basis for the monetary 
award even if the exceptional case finding were overturned on appeal. 
157 Id. at 47. 
158 Id. at 89. 
159 Id. at 99. 
160 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, Qualcomm, 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), ECF No. 718, 2008 WL 66932.  The 
Court did not sanction thirteen other attorneys who had been named in the OSC. 
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attorneys.  Accordingly, the Court concludes it must sanction both 
Qualcomm and some of its retained attorneys.161 
In a scathing and detailed ruling, Judge Major concluded that Qualcomm 
intentionally withheld critical evidence and that its attorneys intentionally or 
recklessly assisted it in this endeavor: 
As set forth above, the Sanctioned Attorneys assisted Qualcomm in 
committing this incredible discovery violation by intentionally hiding or 
recklessly ignoring relevant documents, ignoring or rejecting numerous 
warning signs that Qualcomm’s document search was inadequate, and 
blindly accepting Qualcomm’s unsupported assurances that its document 
search was adequate.  The Sanctioned Attorneys then used the lack of 
evidence to repeatedly and forcefully make false statements and arguments 
to the court and jury.  As such, the Sanctioned Attorneys violated their 
discovery obligations and may have violated their ethical duties.162 
The Court ordered Qualcomm to pay Broadcom’s attorney fees and costs for the 
entire case, albeit to the extent this award was not duplicative with Judge Brewster’s 
previous award under 35 U.S.C. § 285.163  The Court also sanctioned six of the 
responding attorneys, referring them to the State Bar of California for possible 
further sanctions,164 and also requiring them (and Qualcomm) to participate in the 
“Case Review and Enforcement of Discovery Obligations” program (“CREDO”).165 
In her opinion, Judge Major also opined on the expansive—if unrealistic—
deterrent effect she hoped her sanctions order might have not only on the attorneys 
before her, but also to much of the world of complex litigation at large: 
While no one can undo the misconduct in this case, this process, hopefully, 
will establish a baseline for other cases.  Perhaps it also will establish a 
turning point in what the Court perceives as a decline in and deterioration 
of civility, professionalism and ethical conduct in the litigation arena.  To 
the extent it does, everyone benefits—Broadcom, Qualcomm, and all 
attorneys who engage in, and judges who preside over, complex litigation.  
If nothing else, it will provide a road map to assist counsel and corporate 
                                                                                                                                                
161 Id. at *9. 
162 Id. at *18. 
163 Id. at *17. 
164 Id. at *18.  See also Mary McCarthy, Qualcomm Ruling Sends a Warning on Discovery, CAL. 
B.J., Feb. 2008, available at http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/Archive.aspx?month=2&year=2008.  On 
November 10, 2009, the State Bar issued letters to all of the responding attorneys indicating that it 
had completed an investigation of the allegations of professional misconduct against them, but 
determined that no action was warranted at that time.  See generally Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom 
Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2007), ECF Nos. 973, 975–72 (copies of letters from State Bar 
filed with the Court). 
165 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, Qualcomm, 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), ECF No. 718, 2008 WL 66932, at *18. 
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clients in complying with their ethical and discovery obligations and 
conducting the requisite “reasonable inquiry.”166 
Given the dramatic issues in this case and the strong condemnatory language 
used by Judge Major, her opinion and order gained immediate and significant 
publicity.167  But her ruling was ultimately short-lived.  Less than two months later, 
in ruling on objections to Judge Major’s order filed by the sanctioned attorneys, 
Judge Brewster vacated the order on due process grounds and remanded the 
sanctions case for further proceedings.168  Judge Brewster agreed with the sanctioned 
attorneys that Qualcomm’s October 3, 2007 filing of its four employee declarations 
had introduced “accusatory adversity” between Qualcomm and its counsel, thus 
warranting application of the self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilege 
that had previously been denied.169  The sanctions case was thus not over.  And this 
time the lawyers could tell their side of the story fully, even if they revealed 
confidential client communications in doing so. 
3. Placing the Blame  
If the original sanctions case before Judge Major had produced voluminous 
pleadings and evidence, this was multiplied in the remanded proceedings, perhaps 
not surprising given the career-damaging effect of Judge Major’s initial findings and 
order.170  As Judge Major would describe in her second order in the sanctions case—
more than two years after her initial order granting sanctions—the parties made a 
“massive discovery effort” over fifteen months relating to the remanded sanctions 
                                                                                                                                                
166 Id. 
167 Zusha Elinson & Dan Levine, Six Lawyers in Qualcomm Case Sanctioned for ‘Monumental’ 
Discovery Violations, RECORDER (S.F.), Jan. 8, 2008 (stating that the individual lawyers were 
“harshly criticized” by the judge and that “[a]ttorneys across the country have watched the case 
evolve as a cautionary tale of discovery violations even when highly respected litigators are on the 
case”), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=900005500098. 
168 Order Remanding in Part Order of Magistrate Court re Motion for Sanctions, Qualcomm, 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008), ECF No. 744, 2008 WL 638108. 
169 Id. 
170 As would come out in the evidence in these hearings, Judge Major’s initial sanctions ruling 
severely affected the careers of several of the sanctioned attorneys.  See, e.g., Transcript of Order to 
Show Cause Hearing Before Judge Barbara Lynn Major on Oct. 12, 2007 at 66, Qualcomm, Inc. v. 
Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007), ECF No. 712.  See also Craig Anderson & 
Sara Randazzo, Sanctions Lifted Against Lawyer, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 7, 2010 (quoting three of the 
targeted lawyers explaining how the sanctions case has harmed their careers); Zusha Elinson, 
Changing a Judge’s Mind on Qualcomm Sanctions, RECORDER (S.F.), Apr. 12, 2010 (quoting several 
of the responding attorneys describing the profound negative impact the sanctions case has had on 
their careers), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202447902019.  
Moreover, the Day Casebeer firm itself was also adversely affected and ultimately merged with 
another law firm in large part due to the negative publicity the sanctions case generated.  See Craig 
Anderson, Howrey Acquires Silicon Valley IP Boutique, L.A. DAILY J., July 2, 2009, at 1–2 (stating 
that Day Casebeer founder, Lloyd “Rusty” Day, as well lawyers familiar with the sanctions case 
generally, characterized the effect of the sanctions publicity as damaging to the firm). 
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case.171  This discovery resulted in the production of over 170,000 pages of 
documents, as well as the deposition of thirteen witnesses, including Qualcomm 
engineers, its in-house counsel and paralegals, and one of the responding 
attorneys.172  All of this evidence, as well as updated briefing, declarations, and live 
testimony from the six responding attorneys was presented to the Court in a three-
day hearing held on January 13–15, 2010. 
From this extensive evidence, several themes emerged.  First, that throughout 
the pretrial discovery process the responding attorneys had made significant efforts 
to determine whether Qualcomm had participated in the JVT—and when—and, if so, 
whether any documents existed to reflect that.  Leung and Mammen, who had 
primary responsibility for the day-to-day discovery on the JVT issues, indicated that 
from the start of discovery they had an understanding of how they planned to work 
with Qualcomm’s in-house legal team, including its experienced paralegals, who were 
to serve as the main contacts to coordinate the search for responsive witnesses and 
documents.  This understanding, they explained, was reflected in a memorandum 
prepared by Qualcomm that had guided previous discovery procedures in other 
litigation.173  The evidence also showed that Leung and Mammen made multiple 
requests of Qualcomm employees to determine whether the company had 
participated in the JVT proceedings.174  Late in the discovery process, lead trial 
attorney Batchelder, also specifically assigned attorney Patch to assist the JVT fact 
investigation—specifically to act as a new set of eyes on this issue to ensure that it 
had been adequately dealt with, 175 and Patch conducted this investigation.176 
The second major theme that developed from this evidence was that Qualcomm 
appeared to have misled the responding attorneys throughout discovery.  As the 
responding attorneys’ counsel stressed, numerous Qualcomm employees, including 
engineers, paralegals, and in-house lawyers, were aware during discovery that 
Qualcomm has indeed been participating in the JVT from its earliest days, had 
attended JVT meetings, and had studied the H.264 standard, yet “none of these 
people revealed this to outside counsel what they knew.”177  The attorney 
representing Patch in the sanctions case, H. Sinclair Kerr Jr., summarized it in his 
brief as follows:  “Mr. Patch asked the right people the right questions at the right 
time and got wrong—no, false—answers.”178  Counsel for Batchelder also stressed 
this critical fact at the hearing:  “again and again and again, at least thirty-one 
mutually confirming statements from fifteen different Qualcomm employees, 
                                                                                                                                                
171 Order Declining to Impose Sanctions Against the Responding Attorneys and Dissolving the 
Order to Show Cause, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010), 
ECF No. 998, 2010 WL 1336937, at *1. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at *3. 
174 Id. 
175 See id. at *4. 
176 Id. 
177 Transcript of Hearing Before Judge Barbara Lynn Major on Jan. 13, 2010 at 30–31, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010), ECF No. 991 (responding 
attorneys’ counsel, Zeldin, summarizing evidence). 
178 Response to Order to Show Cause by Lee Patch at 3, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 
No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009), ECF No. 942. 
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including two in-house counsel . . . all confirming the same thing [no Qualcomm 
participation in the JVT prior to its adoption as a standard].”179 
Judge Major’s questions and comments at the hearing indicated that she was 
still concerned with how the discovery mistakes had taken place, suggesting that 
Qualcomm’s outside counsel should have known that something was amiss with 
Qualcomm’s discovery responses and efforts.180  Judge Major seemed particularly 
concerned with the fact that none of the Qualcomm 30(b)(6) or other witnesses on the 
JVT issues—which included Raveendran—had their individual computer files 
searched for responsive documents before their depositions, primarily because 
Qualcomm’s outside attorneys accepted the in-house legal team’s representation that 
such a search would have located only cumulative documents that were already in 
Qualcomm’s document repositories.181  This fact was also pounded on by Qualcomm’s 
counsel at the hearings, who suggested that neither Leung nor Mammen had 
sufficient knowledge about Qualcomm’s electronic document systems to make a 
determination of whether or not a document search would be cumulative.182  Lastly, 
the evidence did not fully resolve the issue of why the twenty-one emails on 
Raveendran’s laptop that were ultimately discovered by Bier were not immediately 
produced.  Mammen provided detailed explanations of his thought-process in 
determining that the emails should not be produced, but also ultimately—and 
perhaps wisely—admitted that the failure to produce them was a mistake.183 
The evidence from the hearing was extensive and revealing.  At a minimum, it 
certainly provided a nuanced and fact-specific context that made it difficult for Judge 
Major to characterize the responding attorneys’ actions as evincing an “organized 
program of litigation misconduct”—as she had in her initial sanctions ruling. 
4. The Court Declines to Impose Sanctions 
On April 2, 2010, Judge Major issued a twelve page decision and order declining 
to impose sanctions against any of the six responding attorneys.184  Judge Major 
concluded that “[t]here is still no doubt that this massive discovery failure resulted 
from significant mistakes, oversights, and miscommunication on the part of both 
outside counsel and Qualcomm employees,” yet the new evidence and facts from the 
second sanctions proceedings also “revealed that the Responding Attorneys made 
                                                                                                                                                
179 Transcript of Hearing Before Judge Barbara Lynn Major on Jan. 13, 2010 at 116–17, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010), ECF No. 991 (arguments 
from attorney W. Thomas McGough). 
180 Transcript of Hearing Before Judge Barbara Lynn Major on Jan. 15, 2010 at 134–35 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010), ECF No. 996. 
181 Id. at 81–84, 157–59. 
182 Transcript of Hearing Before Judge Barbara Lynn Major on Jan. 14, 2010 at 42–45, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2010), ECF No. 992. 
183 Supplemental Declaration of Responding Attorney Christian E. Mammen at 20–22, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009), ECF No. 941 (attach. no. 
3); see supra notes 106–107, and accompanying text for a summary of the lawyers’ characterization 
of the emails. 
184 Order Declining to Impose Sanctions Against the Responding Attorneys and Dissolving the 
Order to Show Cause, Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2010), 
ECF No. 998, 2010 WL 1336937, at *7. 
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significant efforts to comply with their discovery obligations,” making sanctions 
unwarranted.185  The Court also characterized the evidence as revealing “an 
incredible lack of candor on the part of the principal Qualcomm employees,” including 
Raveendran, which misled counsel and exacerbated the discovery failure.186  Judge 
Major concluded that there should be no sanction awarded pursuant to FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26, because the evidence established that attorney Leung had made a reasonable 
inquiry about the adequacy of Qualcomm’s discovery responses as to the JVT.187  She 
also held that sanctions were not warranted under the Court’s inherent power to 
sanction parties for “abusive litigation practices,” because none of the responding 
attorneys had acted in “bad faith.”188  With this brief decision, Judge Major dissolved 
the order to show cause that had begun the sanctions case proceedings two years 
earlier.189 
B. Understanding the Sanctions Case  
1. Revisiting Due Process 
What are we to make of the sanctions case?  In light of the detailed evidence 
produced in that proceeding, Judge Major’s final decision to forego sanctions seems 
correct.  As Judge Major concluded, both Qualcomm and its outside counsel made 
mistakes in discovery.  Certain decisions by the responding attorneys, such as the 
determination to withhold production of the twenty-one emails found in 
Raveendran’s laptop archives or the attempt to question her as a witness at trial 
without revealing the existence of these same emails, can readily be criticized (albeit 
in hindsight).  Yet these same actions in context of the full evidence presented in this 
case do not clearly constitute ethical lapses or even necessarily bad lawyering.190 
Additionally, because Judge Major ultimately determined not to sanction the 
responding attorneys, it is difficult to draw many bright-line “lessons” from this case 
that might be helpful to patent litigators other than to “be careful,” “be more 
transparent,” or “trust your clients and colleagues a little less” in the discovery 
process.  This is perhaps best reflected in the testimony of one of the responding 
attorneys, James Batchelder, on the last day of Judge Major’s final hearings in the 
sanctions case.  When asked on the stand whether he did anything different in 
discovery practice in light of what happened in Qualcomm, Batchelder replied that as 
                                                                                                                                                
185 Id. at *2. 
186 Id. at *4. 
187 Id. at *6.  The Court explained that FED. R. CIV. P. 26 allows for sanctions for attorneys who 
sign discovery responses without having made a “reasonable inquiry” as to their adequacy.  Id. at *5.  
Leung was the attorney who had signed the discovery responses at issue.  Id. at *6.   
188 Id. 
189 Id. at *7; see Mike Freeman, Qualcomm Lawyers in Broadcom Case Erred; Judge:  No 
Sanctions; Mistakes Not Willful, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 8, 2010, at C1, available at 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/apr/08/qualcomm-lawyers-broadcom-case-erred. 
190 See, e.g., Thomas Allman, Deterring E-Discovery Misconduct with Counsel Sanctions:  The 
Unintended Consequences of Qualcomm v. Broadcom, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 161, 164–65 (“The 
problem of effective coordination among team members in the world of e-discovery is quite distinct 
from the inappropriate use of abusive or bad faith discovery tactics or strategies by clients or their 
counsel.”). 
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lead counsel in patent cases he now asks for more detailed information, more 
“granular information about which custodians had documents produced from their 
files and which did not.”191  Immediately after making that statement, however, 
Batchelder also tellingly qualified it by remarking that “I don’t want to suggest that 
that is a standard practice that all lead counsel should be held to.  It may not be 
necessary, and a lot of great people can do a great job without doing that, but I do it 
now.”192  Thus, Batchelder himself was reluctant to characterize his change in 
discovery practice as necessarily appropriate for all good lawyers.  Perhaps this 
highlights the fact-specific nature of discovery decisions and the realities of complex 
patent cases.  If so, it is doubtful that much from the Qualcomm case will serve to 
guide patent litigators in their ethical decision making.  That conclusion is reinforced 
by the finding that the lawyers interviewed for this study did not significantly change 
their discovery practices in light of the Qualcomm case. 
The sanctions case is unsatisfying in one additional respect.  While Judge 
Major’s decision not to sanction the responding attorneys on the record presented is 
justified, the overall case is problematic because the sanctions proceedings 
significantly damaged the lawyers’ professional reputations while uncovering no 
ethical lapses.  The prolonged sanctions proceedings are particularly troubling in 
light of the evidence because the facts make clear that Qualcomm’s own employees, 
including its in-house counsel, significantly misled Qualcomm’s outside lawyers in 
the discovery process, thus substantially contributing to the discovery failures in the 
case. 
Both Judge Major and Judge Brewster had speculated in their 2007 orders that 
Qualcomm’s botched discovery could only have resulted from a direct conspiracy 
between Qualcomm and its lawyers to withhold documents vital to Broadcom’s 
defense or, at a minimum, grossly negligent behavior by Qualcomm’s outside 
attorneys.  Judge Brewster’s condemnation of Qualcomm’s outside attorneys was 
made in his order finding the underlying patent litigation case “exceptional” under 35 
U.S.C. § 285 and the order on a remedy for the finding of waiver of Qualcomm’s 
rights to assert its two patents at-issue.193  Because the underlying motions that 
resulted in these orders were directed at Qualcomm, not its attorneys, the attorneys 
had no notice or opportunity to rebut Judge Brewster’s characterizations of their 
alleged egregious misconduct.  Similarly, Judge Major’s initial (and overturned) order 
granting sanctions also condemned  the responding attorneys, despite the fact that 
Judge Major was keenly aware at that point that the lawyers had not been able to 
offer full evidence of their discovery conduct due to Qualcomm’s assertion of the 
attorney-client privilege.194  This raises a serious question as to whether Judge 
Major’s initial sanctions order violated the responding attorneys’ due process rights 
to adequately defend themselves. 
                                                                                                                                                
191 See Transcript of Hearing Before Judge Barbara Lynn Major on Jan. 15, 2010 at 66, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010), ECF No. 996. 
192 Id. 
193 See Order Granting Broadcom’s Motion for Attorney Fees and for Exceptional Case Finding, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007), ECF No. 594, 2007 WL 
2261799, at *1–3. 
194 See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Broadcom’s Motion for Sanctions, 
Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-01958 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), ECF No. 718, 2008 WL 
66932, at *13. 
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Judge Major’s order certainly responded to the dramatic circumstances of 
Qualcomm’s discovery failures that were uncovered only on the last day of trial.  And 
the order also reflected some of the same sense of outrage that a fraud had been 
committed on the Court that seemed to animate Judge Brewster’s decisions.  Yet, 
while Judge Brewster criticized the attorneys, he did not identify them by name nor 
sanction them.  Judge Major did both, while at the same time acknowledging that the 
factual record precluded knowing exactly what these lawyers had or had not done to 
meet their discovery and ethical obligations.  Without much more evidence, Judge 
Major’s suspicions that the responding attorneys must have acted unethically 
because of the ease at which thousands of responsive documents had been located 
post-trial (a suspicion shared by Judge Brewster as articulated in his August 2007 
orders), should not have been the basis for her initial order granting serious 
sanctions against the responding attorneys—something the fuller history of this case 
makes clear.  This case also highlights the very fact-specific nature of discovery 
disputes in complex patent litigation, as sophisticated clients and teams of attorneys 
negotiate and manage discovery obligations in a dense and evolving factual and legal 
context.  In such cases, due process considerations suggest that sanctions against 
individual attorneys for discovery abuse may be warranted only when the attorneys 
are allowed to defend themselves by presenting adequate evidence of how and why 
they acted in discovery. 
One scholar has suggested that trial judges may often be ill-suited to determine 
whether sanctions are warranted against individual attorneys in cases of alleged 
discovery misconduct involving corporate clients and their outside lawyers, stating 
that:  “[i]t is not unusual for a court, in the heat of the moment, to find fault with 
counsel and form adverse conclusions which a more deliberative state bar 
disciplinary process may reject.”195  Of course, this is not to suggest that a judge may 
never properly order sanctions against individual attorneys for discovery misconduct 
that involves both attorneys and their corporate clients, but only to stress that one 
lesson from the Qualcomm sanctions case study is that the determination of whether 
discovery sanctions for attorney misconduct in complex patent litigation may be 
particularly challenging and should not be made without an adequate evidentiary 
record appropriate to the alleged misconduct in the case. 
2. Beyond “Bad Apples”:  Qualcomm as Trouble Case and Everyday Practice 
Is the Qualcomm sanctions case best understood as a “trouble” case—an 
aberration or outlier—or as an “everyday” case—one that reveals the realities of 
everyday practices?196  The answer may very well be both.  Ethical rules and codes 
assume that most lawyers behave ethically, make ethical decisions independent of 
outside influences, and that those “bad apples” who do not must be sanctioned in 
                                                                                                                                                
195 Thomas Y. Allman, Achieving an Appropriate Balance:  The Use of Counsel Sanctions in 
Connection with the Resolution of E-Discovery Misconduct, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 16 (2009). 
196 I borrow the terms “trouble” case and “everyday” case from the law and society literature, 
which has long used these terms to organize and frame some very creative and divergent approaches 
to the study of law.  See, e.g., Austin Sarat et al., Ideas of the “Everyday” and the “Trouble Case” in 
Law and Society Scholarship:  An Introduction, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 
(Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998). 
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order to protect the public interest and the legal profession itself.  The Qualcomm 
sanctions case was initially framed by the Court (and by the legal press) as a 
“trouble” case.  Under this narrative, Qualcomm was characterized as an aggressive 
patent holder, willfully ignoring its discovery obligations in order to gain advantage 
over a major rival in litigation.  Qualcomm’s outside lawyers were depicted as either 
actively facilitating their client’s discovery evasions or at least willfully ignoring 
them.  These lawyers were thus viewed as deviants from a presumed norm of 
ethicality in litigation, and the message sent by the Court in its initial sanctions case 
rulings was that such deviance required severe penalties in order to punish the 
individual wrongdoers and to deter others from similar ethical violations.  Yet, as the 
sanctions case same to an end, the Court continued to characterize Qualcomm’s (and 
its in-house counsel’s) behavior as wrongful.  In light of the evidence, the Court 
concluded that the responding attorneys had met their ethical obligations in 
discovery, even if they had made mistakes in discovery. 
Thus, there is nothing from the Qualcomm case study to suggest that the 
responding attorneys’ conduct was an aberration or exceptional.  The fact that a 
sophisticated client was able to mislead its outside attorneys and that these same 
attorneys made questionable decisions regarding discovery reveals much about the 
context in which contemporary patent litigators work.  The reality may be that the 
Qualcomm sanctions case reveals routine understandings, norms, and everyday 
practices of elite lawyers engaged in complex patent litigation and perhaps high-
stakes litigation more generally.  Although Qualcomm is unique in terms of its 
dramatic circumstances and the publicity it generated, this study suggests it is also 
an “everyday” case in the complex patent litigation context and that the threat of 
discovery sanctions that initially framed the Qualcomm story will likely have little 
effect on how patent litigators conduct themselves in discovery. 
Certainly much of what occurred in the Qualcomm sanctions case is consistent 
with the depiction of patent litigation practice articulated by the lawyers interviewed 
for this study.  Patent litigators view themselves as ethical and understand that their 
firms and clients will not tolerate obviously unethical behavior because the 
reputational harm that may ensue is too costly.  Yet patent litigators view their 
ethical duties narrowly and place a premium on client-centric, zealous advocacy.  
Because of this, the positions they take in discovery are often as aggressive as the 
client allows or demands.  Patent litigators also place a premium on trusting their 
often powerful clients to do what is expected in discovery, and they are loath to 
unduly pressure clients to make sure that reasonable discovery efforts have been 
made, preferring instead to create a sufficient record that the attorneys themselves 
have taken adequate steps to apprise the client of what is required under the rules 
and what the consequences can be for failing to comply with discovery obligations.  At 
the same time, litigators feel pressure to impress senior attorneys with their 
aggressive approach to dealing with discovery demands.  Patent litigators are thus 
influenced by their firms, their clients, and their immediate colleagues on a case as 
much as by individual notions of ethicality and propriety in practice. All of these 
influences shape and perhaps constrain litigators’ ability to identify and respond to 
ethical issues that arise in complex patent litigation.  And it is these influences, not 
court sanctions, that primarily guide patent litigators’ ethical decision-making in the 
discovery process.  Because of this, it is perhaps not surprising that mistakes—and 
even unethical behavior—can readily occur in patent discovery.  Indeed, the 
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interviewed lawyers in this study acknowledge that mistakes are common in 
discovery and that there are significant pressures to push the limits of discovery and 
ethics rules in complex patent cases.  This may explain why the interviewed lawyers 
were hesitant to criticize Qualcomm’s responding attorneys even before Judge 
Major’s final decision not to impose sanctions was issued. 
CONCLUSION:  THE ETHICAL WORLD OF PATENT LITIGATORS IN CONTEXT 
Ethics has long been a central concern of legal profession scholars, yet it is an 
area that is not well examined empirically.  This study provides a window into the 
everyday ethical world of patent litigators in the discovery process, and develops a 
framework for understanding how patent litigators experience and respond to ethical 
issues in practice more broadly.  This study shows that patent litigators, among the 
contemporary legal profession’s most elite and privileged practitioners, are certainly 
not immune to many of the pressures and cultural and structural influences that 
shape and potentially undermine ethical decision-making in legal practice.  Indeed, 
contemporary patent litigation may present a particularly challenging ethical 
landscape precisely because the cases can be complex, involve extraordinary numbers 
of documents, have multiple layers of attorneys involved, and also because the stakes 
in this type of litigation are often very high for both clients and their lawyers.  While 
this study is part of a larger and ongoing body of empirical work on what IP lawyers 
actually do, and its findings are thus preliminary, the study highlights the potential 
insights to be gained from an empirical perspective on the everyday practices of elite 
IP lawyers as it also suggests that legal ethics is an especially fruitful topic for 
further theoretically informed empirical scholarship. 
